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WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY? / 
The transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa aroused 
immense enthusiasm and interest around the world. Massive global 
attention was devoted to the country's first genuinely democratic elections, 
held on April 27, 1994. 
The elections saw the triumph of the African National Congress (ANC) 
with nearly 63% of the vote, and replacement of the previous National 
Party government by a multi-party but ANC dominated Government of 
National Unity. 
The truly remarkable transformation - what Adam and Moodley described 
in 1993 as a 'negotiated revolution' - has seen South Africa warmly 
welcomed back into the international community and widely cited as a 
model for other conflict torn states to emulate. 
The ostensibly similar processes that occurred in Latin America and 
Central Europe towards the end of the 1980s generated a considerable 
literature on the nature of transitions generally, some of which offered 
insights peculiarly appropriate to events in South Africa. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, much of the burgeoning literature which has 
begun to consider the part icularities of the South African transition has 
been versed in these terms (Van Zyl Slabbert 1992; Du Toit 1990). 
The burden of the 'transition literature' has, of course, been concerned 
with assessing the prospects for liberal democracy. This in turn has 
implied a focus on maintaining order and political stability - elusive 
conditions widely deemed necessary for the success of liberal democracy 
- as well as on the nation state as a unit of analysis. It has,- also implied 
a stress on a politics of 'compression' - demobilisation of popular forces 
which in most cases were instrumental in propelling the transition. 
Our concern in this book is rather different. We too have chosen to 
proceed from the insights of transition thpnnr Wp tr^ -
But our particular interest is with the role of the labour movement in 
the transition process, and whether the nature and extent of the1 
democratisation on offer will satisfy and contain the aspirations of South 
Africa's organised workers. 
If it does not, we may conclude either that the labour movement - and 
perhaps other popular social forces - will attempt to push beyond tho 
boundaries of democracy as it has arrived in South Africa or, more 
alarmingly, that the newly democratic regime may resort to authoritarian 
means to re-impose a politics of order. 
The immediate stimulus of this work was an interest on the part of the 
Durban based Workers College to analyse the political attitudes of members 
of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in the run u]) 
to the 1994 general elections. 
The result was a survey of worker opinions, conducted in April 1994 
with the cooperation of Cosatu. Although we hope our findings will be 
of use to the labour movement and of interest to a much wider audience, 
the interpretation of the data collected, and how we chose to present it. 
is our responsibility alone. 
At the end of the day, what lies at the base of this work is concern 
that, while transition theory seems to imply that the success of 
democratisation relies upon a process of 'elite parting', or a limited 
broadening of the distribution of political power, South Africa's new 
democracy - if it is to be a democracy in more than just name - musi 
bring both material benefits and a better quality of life to all people of 
all classes, creeds and races. 
That, after all, was what the struggle against apartheid was all about. 
Theorising transition / 
The theorist whose work we use as a starting point is Adam Przeworski. 
whose Democracy and the Market (1991) provides a particularly succincl 
and systematic analysis of the transition process in recently democratism 1 
countries. Adler and Webster (1995: 83-84) elaborate further. 
Underlying this theory is the assumption that successful transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy can only be brought about as a result 
0f negotiations, of pacts between reformers in the state and moderates 
in the opposition. 
'The political implication is that pro-democratic forces must be 
prudent; they must be prepared to offer concessions in exchange 
for democracy." (Przeworski 1991: 98) 
Przeworski argues that very few transitions to democracy are the result 
of a revolutionary rupture where the ancien regime is overthrown by a 
popular insurrection. Instead, they more usually occur in contexts where 
existing power holders retain much of their control over the levers of 
power in society, property, the military and, not least, the state 
bureaucracy. 
At the same time, they are unable easily to eradicate opposition. Transition 
begins when there is a mutually perceived sense of stalemate, the 
continuation of which becomes untenable: 
"Protagonists agree to terminate conflicts...because they fear a 
continuation of conflict may lead to civil war that will be collectively 
and individually threatening. The pressure to stabilise the situation 
is tremendous since governance must somehow continue. Chaos 
is the worst alternative for all." (Przeworski 1991: 85) 
Przeworski finds the solution to chaos in an alliance between reformers 
inside the authoritarian block and moderates in the pro-democracy 
opposition. Both distance themselves from extremists in their own camps: 
reformers from hardliners and moderates from radicals. Thus both seek 
a sub-optimal solution that will nonetheless allow themselves and their 
society to survive: 
"Reformers face a strategic choice of remaining in an authoritarian 
alliance with hardliners, or seeking a democratic alliance with 
moderates. Moderates, in turn, can seek all out destruction of 
the political forces organised under the authoritarian regime by 
allying with radicals, or they can seek an accommoc|ation by 
negotiating with reformers." (Przeworski 1991: 69) 
This solution is encouraged by the threat of chaos implicit in continued 
stalemate or maximalist solutions: 
"Political actors calculate that whatever difference in their welfare 
not worth the risk inherent in continued conflict." (Przeworski 
1991: 85) 
Reformers and moderates find common cause in a limited, or shrunkei 1. 
notion of democracy in which governments 'must be strong enough to 
govern effectively, but weak enough not to be able to govern against 
important interests'. 
The elitist aspects of liberal democratic theory find new currency as the 
alliance of reformers and moderates commits itself to a form of politics 
that preserves the central pillars of capitalist society, ensuring that 
entrenched power holders - especially the bourgeoisie - maintain a veto 
over the pace, content and institutional form of the new democracy. 
Hence Przeworski concludes that successful transitions require an 
arrangement which is 'inevitably conservative, economically and socially'. 
This is brought about through institutions of 'elite pacted democracy' 
which insulate the government from the broad mass of people by making 
politics the permanent business of a small number of specialised personnel. 
Importantly, however, in such situations governments are confronted with 
two options in relation to social movements. They can either work 1o 
undermine them or they can work with them to garner support for their 
programme. 
Where there are strong social movements, the first path can only be 
pursued at great risk, as it threatens to compromise the democratic 
character of the transition. Consequently, most governments attempt 1o 
draw in social movements through corporatist type arrangements on the 
assumption that these will demobilise and moderate popular movements. 
South Africa's transition 7 
In applying this framework to an analysis of the transition to democracy 
in South Africa, we may usefully start from the mid-1980s, by which 
time the crisis of apartheid had produced an impasse between the white 
controlled state and the popular organisations of the oppressed mass of 
the population. 
No longer could the apartheid state secure the conditions for capital 
accumulation that it had once so effectively done. While previously 
anarfheiH nrrnriHf»H matoridl f— aj—i—mjj— j-i-
had come to engender a level of conflict in society that seriouslyjeopardised 
(he future of capitalism in South Africa. 
Indeed, a low intensity civil war had emerged in the townships, with 
huge parts rendered ungovernable, operating as 'no go areas' for the 
security forces and virtually under the control of what were, effectively, 
(>nibryonic institutions of people's power. 
In the words of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the coordinating 
body which emerged in early 1983 and came to embody the exiled ANC 
in its enforced absence from above ground politics: 
"Not only are we opposed to the present parliament because we 
are excluded, but because parliamentary type of representation 
in itself represents a limited and narrow idea of democracy....The 
rudimentary organs of people's power that have begun to emerge 
in South Africa.. .represent in many ways the beginnings of the 
kind of democracy we are striving for." (Quoted in Lodge 1994: 
24) 
Grassroots democratic pressures could no longer be suppressed through 
the tried and tested states of emergency that once seemed to work so 
effectively. The regime had run out of repressive options and increasingly 
lacked the will, if not the resources, to suppress conflicts occasioned by 
armed struggle and mass action by unions and civics. 
The campaign to make the country ungovernable had stretched the 
resources of the state to a point where further repressive measures would 
have entailed costs that capital was increasingly unwilling to bear. 
Crucially, too, the global financial community had refused to 'roll over' 
the government's debt repayments and harsher sanctions had begun to 
lake a toll. 
However, for all that the government faced mounting difficulties in pursuing 
apartheid, so too did the ANC in seeking to dislodge it. Although it could 
chtim massive popular support, the principal liberation movement failed 
in its bid to unilaterally seize power because, while disruptive, neither 
I lie armed struggle nor the campaign to make the country ungovernable 
neared a point where the state was likely to be overthrown. 
Uibour struggles too - for all that latterly they were spearheaded by 
Cosatu, a federation which Droved strateffirallvhicfhlvastntp - HqH 
alone, albeit over non-workplace issues, is only exceptionally sufficient 
to topple governments. Even South Africa, which by then had one of 
the strongest labour movements in the developing world, was no exception. 
The stalemate could only be broken when the major protagonists realised 
that their individual solutions to South Africa's crisis could not be imposed 
unilaterally on others and that a negotiated solution, with all sides involved, 
would be the only way to achieve some of their aims. 
More specifically, the regime had to accept that the demise of apartheid 
entailed a new, non-racial democracy in which minority interests were 
guaranteed by a Bill of Rights rather than race specific legislation. 
On the other hand, the pro-democracy forces had to accept that the end 
to the stalemate would not be achieved through armed struggle and that 
they too would have to enter the process of negotiating a new order that 
would leave key institutions of the old South Africa intact. 
It was only when the stalemate was finally and mutually acknowledged, 
and when the military formations on both sides came to accept that 
they could not eliminate each other, that the main opposing parties to 
the conflict began to talk to each other. 
Key actors began to sense the stalemate in the mid-1980s when tentative 
and exploratory talks between quasi-official intermediaries began both 
inside the country and abroad. 
An important moment occurred when Kobie Coetzee, Minister of Justice, 
Police and Prisons, began discussions with imprisoned ANC leader Nelson 
Mandela in 1986 (Sparks 1994). Initially, the talks made little headway 
because of the insistence by President PW Botha that Mandela publicly 
renounce armed struggle. 
However, the emergence of FW De Klerk as President in 1989 allowed 
reformists to move decisively in the direction of a negotiated solution. 
In February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released unconditionally and the 
ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) were unbanned. 
Over the next 12 months the ANC, SACP and Cosatu forged a formal 
alliance that cautiously began to distance itself from the armed struggle 
and from more radical elements within their own ranks. In Przeworski's 
Vanishing ideologies / 
Negotiations for a democratic alternative in South Africa began in earnest 
at precisely the moment when notions of alternative forms of democracy 
vanished. 
The collapse of Stalinist societies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
and the bankruptcy of social democracy in Western Europe, had 
transformed the international climate, delegitimising radical notions of 
democracy and social change. This removed the apartheid regime's historic 
fear that the commandist version of democracy, long espoused by the 
SACP, would be imposed on the negotiating process. 
It became imperative at this point that the ANC reassert its organisational 
and ideological hegemony over the radical and precocious grassroots 
social movements that emerged during the near insurrectionary period 
of the 1980s. 
During the 1980s high expectations were generated of a 'revolutionary 
rupture' that would usher in an egalitarian society. It was a period of 
hope, when activists in the labour movement and the civics were de 
facto leaders in the internal democratic movement. 
The first step in the process of demobilisation was the unceremonious 
disbanding of the UDF. While many of its activists joined the ANC, a 
large number withdrew from political activism and were lost to the 
movement. 
At the same time, Cosatu's leadership was increasingly drawn into tripartite 
corporatist type arrangements such as the National Manpower 
Commission, the National Economic Forum and many other forums that 
emerged during the period. 
Initially, Cosatu entered the negotiations with a perception of itself as 
an equal partner in the transition process. Indeed, it applied to participate 
in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa),»which 
constituted the first round of formal negotiations after Febriiary 1990, 
in its own right. 
The application was rejected on the grounds that Cosatu was not a 
political party or government, and it was informed that its interests 
wnillrl ' - J i i ' - " — - - - -
Subsequently, the three organisations entered a formal Tripartite Alliance 
for the purpose of ensuring that each of their positions were accommodated 
in negotiations: ostensibly each party to the Alliance had equal status, 
Cosatu entered into an electoral accord with the ANC on this 
understanding. 
However, this was transformed during 1993 into participation in a broad 
based programme of national consensus, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). Cosatu played a central role in the ANC's 
election campaign, and some 20 Cosatu members stood as ANC national 
candidates. 
Two of its leading members - Alec Erwin, now deputy minister of finance, 
and minister without portfolio Jay Naidoo - were subsequently appointed 
to key ministerial posts in the new Government. 
Transition theory limitations J 
At first glance it appears as if South Africa was a textbook case of 
democratisation along the lines of transition theory. There was indeed 
a meeting of minds between moderates and reformers, and pro-democratic 
forces were prudent in the version of democracy they were willing to 
settle for. 
In Prwezorski's terms we have a parliamentary system based on an interim 
Constitution which effectively protects the interests of capital. In this 
sense, the system is economically and socially conservative. 
But appearances can be deceptive. What transition theory neglects 01 
downplays, and the South African case demonstrates, is the central role 
of social movements - of struggle - in shaping both the modalities anil 
the outcomes of the transition process (Adler and Webster 1995: 76). 
This is our point of departure, and the rationale for our research. 
Although widely recognised as key actors in the transition, remarkably 
little research has been done on the expectations unionised workers have 
of the corporatist trends already visible and their relationship to 
parliamentary democracy. 
The central research question we were concerned with was whether the 
social movement character of the South African labour movement would 
be lost in the face of the new political dispensation, or whether its social 
indicated, the book is based on the findings of a nationwide survey 
c o n d u c t e d among organised workers, and on interviews with key officials 
in Cosatu and its affiliates. They allowed us to identify the persistence 
of a tradition of participatoiy democracy in the workplace and its transfer 
10 the parliamentary arena. 
More significantly, we suggest that there are growing signs of a 'democratic 
rupture' between trade union leaders drawn into corporatist type tripartite 
structures, and rank and file trade union members. 
Farther, in contrast to the 'hegemonic' notion that South Africa has 
become a parliamentary democracy in which the elected majority party 
has a 'Relatively free hand to govern the country as it likes between 
elections, our respondents appeared to be committed to a different notion 
of democracy. They tended to view democracy as an ongoing process of 
decision making in which all people affected should be continuously and 
actively engaged. 
The survey identified a tradition of participatory democracy among Cosatu 
members, whose elected leaders are expected to be accountable and 
report back to their members. Importantly, most were committed to the 
view that parliamentary democracy must be substantially the same and 
consist of elected members held regularly accountable to the citizens. 
If the new Government fails to deliver, workers claimed they would resort 
to ongoing mass action to force the Government to live up to its electoral 
promises. 
We argue that this - not a rightwing coup d'etat or demands for sovereign 
ethnic states - constitutes the greatest challenge facing the Government 
of National Unity: a challenge which could propel the Government towards 
redistributive policies by mobilising pressure from civil society, the 
community and the workplace. 
The South African case holds open the possibility of a less conservative 
outcome than transition theory would suggest. 
THE COSATU WORKER SURVEY: 
RESEARCH METHOD AND TECHNIQUES 
Much has been written of the broad dynamics of South Africa's transition. 
1 lowever, little extensive empirical work has been done on the perceptions 
of key groupings in society towards the transition, other than the broadest 
opinion polls. 
This study focused on Cosatu union members, looking in particular at 
I heir political attitudes, aspirations and strategic choices, but also at 
Ihc composition of this leading segment of the contemporary union 
movement in South Africa. 
The principal research technique employed was a survey, although a 
series of in depth interviews were also conducted among Cosatu officials. 
The latter research strategy involved a semi-structured questionnaire 
administered to 20 Cosatu officials in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, 
Western Cape and Gauteng. 
This chapter describes general demographic trends regarding Cosatu's 
membership and, very briefly, some of the methods employed in the 
research. A more detailed outline of the research methods, describing 
lheir limits as well as their potential, can be obtained from the authors 
if so desired. 
During the 1980s there was a heavy emphasis in many of the social 
sciences in South Africa on what may be loosely determined 'political 
economy', focusing on general trends concerning the statfe, key 
socio-political actors, resistance and change, as opposed to more directly 
empirically founded quantitative studies. 
This research seeks, in a modest way, to redress something of this 
imbalance, not only by contributing to contemporary debates but also 
by demonstrating some of the Dossihilii i>i nf — J - " 
Most public opinion surveys in South Africa have been constrained hv 
limitations in the sampling frames employed, as borne out by the 
inaccuracies in opinion polls conducted before the 1994 elections. 
DEMOGRAPHIC PARTICULARS 
Union regions and members 
The study reached members of almost all the Cosatu unions. It 
encompassed most of the major unions, to provide an accurate reflection 
of the attitudes, values and perceptions of their members. All the major 
Cosatu regions were covered. 
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Although the sample encompassed trade unionists with a wide range of 
education levels, it is interesting to note that the overwhelming majority 
of Cosatu members had, at the very least, some degree of formal education 
and literacy (Figure 1). 
It should be noted that Cosatu workers as a proportion of the labour 
market have better than average education levels. Most respondents 
and the labour market 
Of considerably greater interest was the respondents' age levels. Most 
respondents were clustered in the 35 to 56 year band (Figure 2). This 
probably reflects greatly diminished employment opportunities over the 
lasl 15 years. 
Figure 2: Age of Respondents 
People in the formal economy would be less inclined to even temporarily 
leave their jobs, while those entering the labour market for the first time 
would be most unlikely to gain formal employment. This finding is par-
ticularly disturbing because it reflects the degree to which an entire 
generation have not been integrated into the formal economy and are 
probably condemned to remain 'outsiders' for the bulk of their working 
lives. 
Experiences of unions 
The 
average respondent first joined the independent unions in 1982. 
fhis average is somewhat skewed because a minority joined trade unions 
in the early 1970s - or even before. A small grouping of respondents belonged to the South African Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), which 
However, it seems that at least half of Cosatu's members belonged to u 
trade union prior to the federation's formation. While Cosatu has certainly 
expanded, it also represents a consolidation of an already well established 
union tradition and encompasses distinctive earlier traditions, such as 
those of Sactu. 
Whatever their background, many respondents changed unions around 
the time of Cosatu's launch, reflecting realignments in the union movement 
prior to unity and the formation of industrial unions afterwards. 
Skill and the union movement 
Figure 3 reflects the skills levels of Cosatu members and, importantly, 
shows that the majority of Cosatu members are semi-skilled or skilled. 
This demonstrates a dramatic shift in the labour market and the changing 
nature of the union movement. 
Figure 3: Occupational Category 
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Hindson (1987: 98-100) noted that the apartheid labour market was 
segmented between pass bearing 'insiders' and 'illegal outsiders', in ad-
dition to earlier racial segmentations. 
It is possible that this could have been replaced by a new form of 
segmentation, between semi-skilled and skilled, unionised 'insiders' and 
unskilled non-unionised 'outsiders'. The increasing skill content of 
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Then' is little doubt that in terms of security of tenure and wage levels 
. in addition to a privileged bargaining position - trade union members 
constitute a relatively privileged grouping. 
H is also apparent that it was during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when the independent unions rapidly expanded, that the skilling of the 
black labour force largely took place. 
Bill the question arises as to whether the line of segmentation is on 
skill or the fact of union membership, the latter underlaid by the recruiting 
focus of the unions and the limits of trade union expansion. 
In favour of the latter is that in sectors where unions are the strongest, 
they have been most successful in compressing the pay gap between 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers (Wood 1994: 191). 
In other words, unions remain highly effective in representing the interests 
of members who are in a less favourable position. This distinction could 
overshadow earlier divisions over migrancy versus settled labour, especially 
as over time pure migrants tend to shift to semi-settled labour relations. 
General trends 
A number of demographic trends are apparent, reflecting the changing 
nature of the labour movement. Firstly, it is apparent that Cosatu 
encompasses a number of distinct traditions and types of trade unionism. 
This is more fully explored in the next chapter. 
Secondly, it is evident that Cosatu's membership reflects fundamental 
shifts in the nature of the labour market. In particular, as mentioned, 
relatively few Cosatu members are recent entrants to the labour market, 
reflecting greatly diminished employment opportunities and the extent 
to which an entire generation has been marginalised. 
H is also evident that most Cosatu members are at least semi-skilled. 
However, although union members do certainly constitute a more 'inside' 
segment of the labour market compared to the rural poor and the less 
formally employed, by no means should unions be seen as mere coalitions 
of the skilled (Wood 1994: 191). 
Ihev remain ^enerallv effective at nursuing the interests of all members. 
THE RESEARCH METHOD 
The survey 
• Sampling procedure 
The total sample size was 643 respondents. The sample size was computed 
after a pilot study had been conducted through simple quota sampling 
in the Durban region. The pilot study also helped formulate the final 
interview schedule and resulted in the elimination or modification of 
ambiguous or difficult to comprehend questions. 
The final survey was conducted through probability sampling, through 
the area sampling method. Area sampling can involve systematic sampling, 
where each unit constitutes a collection of elements. 
In systematic sampling, the final sampling frame is drawn up during 
the interviewing process, which enables a probability sample even where 
an accurate list of the population is not available or where individuals 
are difficult to trace - making it ideally suited to South Africa, when-
accurate records of populations are not always available. 
Interviews were conducted at the workplace level, rather than in terms 
of selected individual respondent's names (Bailey 1987: 87-88). 
The overall population was divided into a series of readily identifiable 
strata, defined in terms of Cosatu geographic regions. These regions 
constituted the Primary Sampling Unit. A Secondary Sampling Unit was 
made up of individual firms. Finally, fieldworkers were instructed to 
select respondents at each workplace systematically. 
These elements, together with spread in residential centres, contributed 
to a representative sample of Cosatu members. The responses to most 
key questions dealing with perceptions proved remarkably homogeneous, 
which greatly facilitated in making the sample representative. 
• The questionnaire 
The questionnaire used mostly close ended questions, facilitating cross 
comparisons between individual responses, expediting coding and making 
for a consistent and straightforward interviewing process. Some open 
detail where necessary, and certain response categories were collapsed 
to further simplify the interviewing process. 
Most notably, instead of the conventional Likert scale of five responses, 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, three response categories 
w-evc employed in questions requiring some scale of responses - agree, 
neUiral, and disagree. This greatly facilitated statistical analysis and 
e n a b l e d clarity in interpreting responses. 
j Operation 
A lew Cosatu unions do not have an orthodox shop floor structure and 
have a rather widely dispersed membership. It was not possible to include 
such unions because of time and cost constraints. Access problems 
precluded or restricted representation of two unions, but as there was 
very little difference in patterns of response, this did not seriously limit 
(he study. 
Individual firms were selected and clusters of firms were sampled in 
each region. The names of individual firms were selected through the 
normal (white pages) telephone directory. The list of firms was then 
narrowed down to those .where a Cosatu affiliate had an organisational 
presence. Finally, individual firms were systematically selected. 
Firms were contacted and arrangements made for conducting the 
interviews. Most willingly cooperated. Although heavy reliance on 
management for access could have resulted in workers being suspicious 
of the motives of the study, this did not generally seem to be the case. 
Many workers had been informed of the survey by their unions or shop 
stewards, and participated enthusiastically, and Cosatu National had 
given full support to the study. 
Each legion was placed under the direction of one or more of the authors 
oi this book. Individual interviewers were then employed. After intensive 
training at regional level, interviewers were sent into the field, mostly in 
pairs. Where language difficulties were anticipated, interviewers fully 
conversant with the vernacular were used. / 
I lie original interview schedules were in English, which was employed 
wherever possible. The interview schedules were administered by 
interviewers, rather than questionnaires being completed by respondents, 
to assist those with literacv nrnhlpmc aii™>r r™- - - • 
After the interviews were conducted, interviewers were debriefed and 
their comments and observations collected. Finally, extensive cross checks 
with randomly selected firms and unions were conducted to ensure thai 
the interviewing process had taken place in the desired manner. Most 
interviews seemed to capture the individual views of workers, although 
in a small minority of cases it seemed that a collective opinion was 
captured. 
• Data processing 
The Department of Sociology at Rhodes University coded and processed 
the data. The use of mostly pre-coded close ended questions greatly 
facilitated the process. Union names and centres where the interviews 
were conducted were post coded. The data was then captured on compuler. 
Non-responses were coded as 0, which facilitated identification of quest ions 
with unusually high levels of non-response. The highest levels of 
non-responses were recorded in questions probing political allegiances, 
Trained student research assistants entered the data, after which a 
comprehensive checking and cleaning process was conducted. Individual 
members of the research team were then supplied with comprehensive 
summary statistics and graphs. 
• Ethics and accountability 
The anonymity of individual respondents and workplaces selected was 
rigorously observed. Only overall trends and relationships were analysed. 
The informed consent of individual respondents was sought prior to 
conducting the interviews. Respondents were assured that the findings 
would be made widely available, and that their union would be informed 
of the outcome of the research. 
The interviews 
A second research strategy involved a semi-structured questionnaire 
administered to 20 Cosatu officials. The questionnaire was designed to 
elicit information relating specifically to the impact of elections on the 
organisation and resources of Cosatu. A member of the research team 
Sakhele Buhlungu, interviewed Cosatu officials in KwaZulu-NaUil. 
Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Gauteng. 
TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 
'I'llis chapter focuses on Cosatu workers' perceptions of and participation 
in trade union democracy. It provides some measures of the current 
suite of shop floor democracy in the federation, levels of participation in 
union affairs and the relationship between participation and democracy. 
But what is trade union democracy and how do workers arrive at their 
understanding of it? 
To provide a framework for answering these questions, the chapter begins 
with an exposition of the historical development of trade union democracy 
in i:he country that gave birth to trade unionism - Britain. 
The reasons why the British experience is chosen are because many 
Cosatu unions modelled their democracy on that which existed in British 
unions in the early 1970s, and because the exposition helps clarify concepts 
which are central to this book - direct democracy, oligarchy, participative 
democracy and shop floor or workplace democracy. 
This is followed by an assessment of the development of democracy in 
some Cosatu unions, focusing particularly on the growth of a participatory 
shop floor democratic tradition in independent unions that emerged in 
the 1970s. The rapid growth of unions in the 1980s, and resulting 
organisational problems they experienced in the early 1990s, are then 
presented. 
This information provides a key to understanding Cosatu workers' 
approach to trade union democracy and their knowledge - or lack of 
knowledge - of their unions' activities and involvement in broader national 
economic and political issues. 
jlljsf' < 
All cr providing a broad historical canvas, the results of the survey regarding 
members' perception and practice of shop floor democracy are discussed 
ir' considerable detail. Particular attention is paid to regional and 
"ilra-union variations, followed by an assessment of the durability of 
union democracy in the face of pressures towards institutionalisation 
and bureaucratisation. 
A DEMOCRATIC TRADITION 
Development of union democracy 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb examined the development of democracy in 
British trade unions from their origins up to the early 20th Century. 
Their ideas are encapsulated in the landmark work, Industrial Democracy, 
published in 1897. 
The Webbs called the first stage of trade union democracy to have emerged 
'primitive democracy'. It had taken place in local trade clubs of the 1 Klh 
Century and was a form of direct participatory democracy. 
Members strived to conduct business at general meetings and were imbued 
with the principle of 'what concerns all should be decided by all' (Webb 
1911: 8). The president was often only chosen for a particular mee1iiig. 
and the next most important officers were usually chosen by rotalion. 
The early 'trade clubs' were thus organisations in which all members 
participated without an established hierarchy of officials. 
When local unions started federating into national unions between 1824 
and 1840 it was no longer possible for unions to practice direct democracy. 
On account of their regional dispersion it became necessary for national 
unions to elect full-time secretaries. 
But the process of centralisation and bureaucratisation took place slowly, 
with considerable resistance from below (Hyman 1975: 7). This led to 
moves to preserve the supreme authority of members by means of a 
referendum which granted any section of the union the right 'to insist 
on its proposals being submitted to the vote of the whole electorate' 
(Webb 1911: 21). 
As it happened, the referendum had the opposite effect of what was 
intended. Instead of members retaining a real say in the affairs of the 
union, control became increasingly centralised and enabled the 
development of oligarchic rule by officials and the executive because: 
'The right of putting questions to the vote came practically to be 
confined to the executive.. .Any change which the executive desired 
could be stated in the most plausible terms and supported by 
convincing arguments, which almost invariably secured its adoption 
by a large majority." (Webb 1911: 26) 
Towards the last decade of the 19th Century, after about a century of 
organisational experience, oligarchy - domination by a few officials - had 
become prevalent in the British trade union movement. 
This, the Webbs maintained, was because of the attempt to retain direct 
participatory democracy in national organisations {Webb 1911; 36). Hyman 
(]j)7.r): 71) adds that unions which had open membership policies soon 
experienced internal divisions and conflicts of interest, necessitating strong 
leadership direction. 
The more advanced trade unions had, however, become aware of the 
existence and causes of oligarchy. Their constitutions therefore underwent 
a 'silent revolution' after 1889 to emerge with a representative form of 
democracy. In the opinion of the Webbs this was successful in solving 
'the fundamental problem of democracy, the combination of administrative 
efficiency and popular control' (Webb 1911: 38). 
The central feature of the system of representative democracy was electing 
an assembly of representatives as the supreme body in the union. It 
also appointed an executive committee which governed the union between 
conferences of the assembly. 
To obtain a balance between workers' aspirations and eff icient 
administration, unions made provision for representation of both workers 
and officials on their assemblies and executive committees. 
For example, the executive committee of the Cotton Operatives consisted 
of three office bearers as well as 13 additional members, seven of whom 
had to be working spinners while the remaining six were permanent 
officials (Webb 1911: 39). 
Although officials still tended to dominate at assembly conferences, worker 
representatives frequently intervened 'with effect' in the procedures (Webb 
191 L: 44). 
% 
This form of worker participation, however, only took place at the level 
of the supreme representative assembly, not the shop floor. It not only 
limited the potential for trade union democracy through rank and file 
participation, but also opened the way for oligarchic tendencies to reassert 
themselves in unions. 
Tile way these oligarchic tendencies were overcome in British trade unions 
was through the emergence of a strong shon — ' " ' 
stewards initially had the task of protecting their craft from job dilution, 
but the scope of their activities was widened to workplace negotiation 
at the end of the 19th Century (Clegg 1979: 21). 
Soon they assumed the role of representing workers in all dealings with 
management on matters of pay and working conditions, and assisting 
workers in voicing their personal grievances (Torrington 1972: 603). 
After briefly emerging during World War I, shop stewards came to the 
fore in industrial relations in Britain in the 1960s as they shifted the 
emphasis of negotiation to workplace bargaining. The drive was provided 
by the rise in rank and file strength and militancy (Lane 1974: 162). 
In the upsurge of workplace bargaining the shop stewards' role was no 
longer one of protecting a craft, but negotiating directly with managemenl 
on the shop floor over wages and a wide range of working conditions. 
This included health and safety, dismissal and other disciplinary actions, 
as well as negotiating the introduction of new machinery and jobs (Clegg 
1979: 24). 
The upsurge in autonomous workplace bargaining under the leadership 
of shop stewards made an impact on trade union organisation as well. 
The most significant change was the incorporation of shop stewards inio 
union structures. 
By impelling themselves onto various bodies of unions, shop stewards 
did much to restore democratic practices in unions once again. Decision 
making in unions shifted towards the shop floor as pressure could he 
brought to bear- from shop stewards who had autonomous power bases 
in the workplace (Clegg 1979: 220). 
Although much more could be added about the historical and contemporary 
struggle to establish and maintain democracy in trade unions, enough 
has been said to provide some conclusions based on the British expej iencc 
(Maree 1986: 33-53). 
The first is that efforts by national unions to maintain direct participatory 
democracy resulted in oligarchy. The second is that the introduction of 
representative democracy in unions' assemblies and executives did a 
great deal to restore democracy to unions. The third is that the emergence 
of a strong shop stewards movement in the 1960s introduced participaioiy 
shop floor democracy to unions. 
participatory democracy in Cosatu 
The origins of participatory democracy in Cosatu can be traced to unions 
(hat emerged in South Africa at the time of the Durban strikes in 1973. 
Almost from the outset these unions were committed to creating 
participatory shop floor democracy in their structures. 
Independent unions which emerged in the 1970s and which 
concentrated on participatory workplace organisation were the then 
Natal and Transvaal unions belonging to the Trade Union Advisory and 
Coordinating Council (Tuacc) and the Western Province General Workers 
Union [WPGWU) in Cape Town, which subsequently became the General 
Workers Union (GWU). 
The Tuacc unions merged with other independent unions in 1979 to 
form the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu). In 1985 
Fosatu, the GWU and numerous other unions committed to non-racism 
founded Cosatu. 
A key influence in these unions were intellectuals based at the liberal 
universities of Natal, the Witwatersrand and Cape Town. They were moved 
by the upsurge of the shop steward movement in British trade unions 
in the 1960s as well as the strong surge for participatory democracy 
(hat followed in the wake of the 1968 student and worker revolts in 
France and other European countries. 
Workers, for their part, threw themselves with zest into the task of building 
factory committees comprising worker representatives. In due course the 
committees became shop steward committees comprising elected shop 
stewards (Maree 1986). 
In practice the strategy of workplace organisation was implemented in 
different ways by distinct union groupings. The Tuacc unions in Natal 
commenced with mass recruitment as workers poured into unions after 
the Durban strikes. When the weakness of this organisational strategy 
dawned on organisers during 1974 and 1975 the unions switched to 
in-depth workplace organisation. 
ohop stewards were given the key tasks of recruiting and organising 
workers, collecting subscriptions, canvassing worker positions on issues 
and taking them up with management. To do so, they had to meet 
regularly, usually weekly, as committees where thev also rereiVeH truminn 
By contrast, the Metal and Allied Workers Union (Mawu) branch of Tua<v 
in Johannesburg engaged in intensive workplace organisation right from 
the outset. At Heinemann Electric, the union's best organised factory, 
as many as three weekly meetings were being held during the intensive 
struggle for recognition by the union. 
The tradition continued after the union lost the Heinemann dispute: 
shop stewards' meetings of all factories being organised were held weekly 
and more frequently when there was a dispute taking place. 
The WPGWU also emphasised workplace organisation, although it 
organised works committees rather than shop stewards' committees. In 
effect there was no difference as the works committees consisted of elected 
worker representatives. 
From the outset regular weekly meetings were held with works committees 
from organised plants. Monthly general meetings of rank and file members 
from each enterprise were also held. The union gradually developed a 
principle that worker representatives rather than officials should negotiate 
with management, to ensure the representativeness and accountability 
of negotiators. 
The above account shows that the foundations of workplace participatoiy 
democracy were firmly laid in independent unions that emerged during 
the 1970s and subsequently became affiliates of Cosatu. 
Representative democracy also developed in unions during this period. 
Already in the late 1970s unions were struggling to ensure that democracy 
was truly representative. An example from Tuacc in Natal illustrates how 
unions tried to ensure the representativeness of their democratic 
structures. 
Implementing representative democracy 
The commitment of intellectuals in the movement to democracy led (hem 
to construct Tuacc in a way that built worker control formally into the 
organisation. Tuacc consisted of a council and secretariat: the council 
was composed of the full branch executive committees of unions affiliated 
to it. 
The secretariat comprised two representatives nominated by each affiliated 
union, only one of whom could be a paid official. Furthermore, under 
(lie Tuacc constitution only trade union representatives had voting rights 
on the council and secretariat. The principle of worker representative 
majorities was thus built into both the council and secretariat. 
Although a democratic structure with worker majorities was created, 
ensuring the representativeness of the union representatives on Tuacc 
was a basic problem. The minutes of the first Tuacc secretariat meeting 
on June 23, 1975, reflected concerns about the danger of secretariat 
members not representing the interests .of their constituents. 
Representatives were encouraged to report back to their branch executive 
committees and union or local staff meetings. They were also reminded 
lliat, since they did not attend the meeting as individuals they were only 
entitled to put forward the arguments of their union, not their own point 
of view. 
This turned out to be a vain hope. Four years later, in 1979, the secretary's 
report to the Natal Regional Council noted that: 
'The functioning of the secretariat remains a matter of concern. 
There is a need for all members of the secretariat to improve the 
extent to which they express the position of those they represent 
rather than simply their own viewpoint." 
By that stage the Mawu branch had taken steps to overcome the problem. 
The Mawu branch executive committee submitted specific resolutions to 
the secretariat rather than leaving it up to Mawu representatives to put 
forward the union's position. 
It is clear that the form of democracy being established in unions was 
both participatory and representative. 
The democratic ethic 
The foundations of Cosatu workers' understanding of trade union 
democracy were laid during the 1970s. But it was not only a set of 
democratic practices and structures that were entrenched: a democratic 
ethic was also implanted in union members. 
What the unions were trying to achieve in the 1970s and what lay behind 
tlic thinking of intellectuals was well expressed in an interview in 1979 
with Alec Erwin - now Deputy Minister of Finance - who became secretary 
of Tuacc in 1977 and, after that, the first general secretary of Fosai u. 
In his words: 
"It seems to me there are, broadly speaking, two conceptions of 
democracy. One I would styk i radical liberal conception which 
is that everyone must have in ay and be allowed to vote. And 
within those people someone must be a leader. 
"I think that kind of democracy is actually open to disguised 
power manipulation and control because every man speaking will 
not change basic structures or institutions in society. We'd say 
you must have resilient structures that can hold people accountable 
in a real sense. 
"So the alternate conception of democracy is a much more 
structured view: that people must be able to control what is possible 
to control. We must establish more definite structures of 
accountability. 
"So what we were trying to build in Tuacc, and are presently 
trying to achieve in Fosatu, is that the democratic structure must 
be through a process of the factory controlling the shop steward 
because that man the worker sees every day in the plant: his 
access to him is far greater. 
'Then the shop steward sits on the branch executive committee 
and the report back system is structured and definite. If I could 
contrast this, say, to a branch executive committee that is elected 
at an annual general meeting. There is no clear structure of 
systematic accountability there. So we've been trying in Tuacc to 
build that structure up from shop steward to branch executive 
committee to Tuacc. 
"Now that is a very much slower process because structures in 
themselves never create democracy. Only aware leadership and 
membership create democracy. 
"So once having built shop stewards you then have to make them 
effective shop stewards. If they are effective their membership is 
going to be more informed, conscious and interested in knowing 
what they are doing. And likewise good shop stewards will make 
a good branch executive committee, and a good branch executive 
committee a good national executive committee." 
krvvin's evaluation of the extent to which intellectuals in Tuacc had 
succeeded in creating democratic trade unions by 1979 flowed from the 
f0nii of democracy they were pursuing: 
"Now it does mean that the conceivers of democratic structures, 
the intellectual leadership, will be more dominant in the initial 
period. While there is no doubt that a few of us have been very 
important and dominant and we pushed and bulldozed to some 
cvtent, I think that the practices and lines we've established are 
democratic and resilient. 
"I think we built up branch executive committees and shop stewards 
who can decide for themselves, who are effective in their own 
plants. The more successful they are the more that leadership 
will become powerful and effective. Now working on that conception 
of democracy will take more time. 
"1 would say in Tuacc, while we (the intellectuals) might be powerful 
(here's no possibility that we could massively abuse the power 
siructures. It is just because certain ethics have been established 
which cannot be broken at this point no matter how dominant 
ihe intellectual might be. 
"We have more resilient checks against our power than whatever 
had been achieved by the liberal democratic conception of 
democracy. I don't deny that we might have a lot of power and 
influence, but equally it is nonsense to say that workers must 
just democratically rise up. 
"To my mind the one thing that the Tuacc experience did create 
was its conception that workers' control as an ethic is crucial 
and that the branch executive committee is more important than 
ihe organiser. I do believe we've got that. 
"We haven't as yet got a capacity for the branch executive committee^ 
lo effectively dominate the organiser, but the ethic that it should 
do is firmly implanted and not challengeable. So I think an organiser 
can't step too far outside that. If he does he's gone." 
The: account so far has outlined the historical development of trade union 
democracy in Britain and the way in which it was practised in South 
Ali •ii a by independent unions that emerged during the 1970s and 
Sllbse.nupnthr hpfcimo /~< 
In the next section the rapid growth during the 1980s of independent 
unions, particularly Cosatu, is presented. The organisational consequences 
for Cosatu of rapid growth are also examined. 
UNION GROWTH IN THE 1980s 
Rapid growth 
After the state 'legitimised' African trade unions in 1979 by granting 
them official recognition, independent unions grew rapidly in the 1980s. 
The trend continued, although at a decelerating rate, into the 1990s. 
Total trade union membership from 1979 to 1991 increased almost fourfold 
from 700 000 to 2,7 million with trade union density - the proportion 
of the labour force unionised - in the non-agricultural sector rising from 
15% to 53% (Macun 1993: 49). More specifically, membership of 
independent, mainly African unions shot up in the first four years alter 
1979 from 70 000 to 300 000. 
Unions made most headway with formal recognition: whereas there were 
only five recognition agreements at the end of 1979 there were no less 
than 406 by the end of 1983. Fosatu accounted for 70% of the agreements 
(Maree 1985: 297). 
Cosatu also made very rapid headway. At the time of its formation in 
November 1985 it had 462 000 members: by the end of 1991 its 
membership had increased almost threefold to 1,26 million. 
Three quarters of its members in 1991 were concentrated in the 
manufacturing and mining industries. It was in the manufacturing set-tor 
that Cosatu's membership started levelling off in the 1990s. On the other 
hand, public sector unions in Cosatu started growing rapidly in the 
1990s (Macun 1993: 49-50). 
There appear to be three major reasons for the rapid growth of independent 
unions in the 1980s. The first was because of the changed poliiical 
climate brought about by the state's 'legalisation' of African trade unions. 
Secondly, sound workplace organisation in the form of shop steward 
structures combined with good local and national leadership was a key 
factor in unions' growth. Finally, economic conditions, especially inflation. 
spurred workers to join unions in order to protect their real wages (Macun 
1993: 51-52). 
Organisational consequences 
'['he rapid growth of unions in the 1980s meant that they grew large 
- in some cases extremely large - with their organisation extending to 
ihe national level. 
Negotiations became more centralised and issues dealt with more complex. 
The structures of unions became more complex, with regional and national 
executive committees coming on top of branch executive committees. 
The organisational structure of Cosatu also became more complex. As 
union densities increased, local shop stewards councils emerged in 
different localities, with shop stewards from all the unions operating in 
the localities required to attend the meetings. 
As the unions and Cosatu grew in strength they exercised their political 
and strategic muscle by forcing their way onto statutory institutions 
such as the National Manpower Commission and National Training Board. 
They also took the initiative in creating forums on which they could 
influence economic and industrial policy. The National Economic Forum 
was the most significant and was only established after a hard struggle 
by organised labour. 
The implications of these developments for trade union democracy was 
(hat rank and file members as well as shop stewards became increasingly 
distanced from the central issues which unions were contesting in the 
1990s. The issues being dealt with also became so complex that it was 
beyond the capacity of shop stewards to grasp and debate them. 
As a result agendas of local shop stewards' council meetings became 
dominated by issues that came from 'head office'. The complexity of the 
issues meant that, far from generating vibrant debates and giving mandates 
for national action, local meetings often turned into long briefing sessions 
(Marie 1992: 22). 
Besides the lack of shop steward expertise, a problem lay in the Cosatu 
practice of discussing every issue in every structure. Ironically, the practice 
had the opposite effect of the intended worker control. Instead, it created 
conditions for the develonmpnt <~.f ~ 
Consequently, attendance at local meetings declined. In 1992 around 
100 out of a possible 500 shop stewards turned up at Cosatu's Durban 
local whereas in the Johannesburg local only about 100 of a potential 
1 000 shop stewards attended regularly (Keet 1992: 35). 
The hierarchical growth of Cosatu unions also placed strain on 
representatives within unions. Effective shop stewards who made it on I o 
national executive committees were also on their regional and branch 
committees. 
As an observer noted, for a shop steward to be effective it would have 
been 'advantageous to attend the whole sequence of meetings upwards', 
but for a shop steward to be diligent could require 'attending after work 
meetings every night of the week, and over the weekend' (Keet 1992: 
32). 
These structural problems in Cosatu and its affiliates implied that worker 
control could no longer be practised effectively in the 1990s. However, 
an even more basic problem that emerged was a breakdown in 
communication within unions, both from the bottom up and from the 
top down. The implication was that rank and file members of unions 
were no longer aware of what their leaders did at national level. 
Research conducted in this survey highlighted these issues. In particular 
it tested the extent to which union democracy was still operating in the 
workplace. It also evaluated the extent to which members were in touch 
with their unions' corporatist practices at the national level - a theme 
which is examined extensively in the next chapter. 
UNION DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE 
Union membership 
From modest beginnings, unions belonging to Sactu enjoyed growth in 
the late 1950s, with membership peaking at 53 000 in 1961. Thereafter, 
following the banning of the ANC, union membership declined and Snclu 
removed itself into exile. 
Black unions emerged again as a significant force in the 1970s and, in 
the early years, struggled for survival. But as Figure 4 demonstrates, 
the overwhelming majority of respondents in our survey joined a union 
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for the first time during the 1980s and in 1990, after which the rate of 
joining tapered off. 
This corresponds with the rapid growth of black trade unions during 
(he 1980s in the wake of the 1979 Wiehahn reforms in labour relations, 
which heralded state recognition of African trade unions for the first 
time in the country's history. 
Most respondents had therefore been members of a trade for four to 14 
years, with the median falling in 1985 and most workers having belonged 
to unions for nine years. 
A large proportion of the sample was drawn from members of former 
i'osatu unions and other unions that emphasised participative shop floor 
democracy - the 'workerist' unions - the most important exceptions being 
workers formerly belonging to the South African Allied Workers Uniqn 
(Saawu) and the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu). 
Saawu disbanded when Cosatu was established, its membership being 
divided between umbrella industrial unions, often centred around former 
Fosatu affiliates. Although there have been some recorded instances of 
tensions between former Fosatu and Saawu members - most notably a 
dispute at Mercedes Benz in 1990 (Von Holdt 1990:15-26) - this process 
"I absorption was generally successful-
Unfortunately the survey did not cover many of the most recently unionised 
workers: those in the public sector, especially in the former homelands. 
Public sector workers enter the union movement with a rather different 
body of experience to other categories of workers. 
Also, public sector workers are less likely to have had any direct previous 
experience of the limits and possibilities of union organisation. It is 
uncertain what impact these new unionists will have on established 
union democratic practices. 
Traditionally, the bulk of Cosatu's members have been in I lie 
manufacturing and mining sectors. For reasons beyond our com ml, 
members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) were somewhat 
under represented in our sample. This is unfortunate, not least because 
NUM was founded in 1982 under the Council of Unions of South Africa 
'(Cusa), which stressed the importance of black leadership. 
NUM abandoned this creed in favour of non-racialism when it became 
a founding affiliate of Cosatu, but it would have been interesting to 
observe more closely whether it manifested any particular democratic 
features reflecting its Cusa background. 
However, based on the limited number of interviews with miners which 
we were able to conduct, it does not seem that there were major differences 
between their attitudes and values and those of workers in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Shop steward structures 
Almost all respondents - 99 % - reported functional shop steward struc 111 res 
at their workplace. This shows that Cosatu has successfully maintained 
the tradition of shop floor organisation. 
It should be noted that such organisation promotes multi-layered 
leadership, which is particularly important since the upper echelons ol 
the union movement have been siphoned off into Parliament and other 
state structures. As was apparent when the state banned 24 trade union 
activists in November 1976, the sudden removal of key leaders can severely 
damage union organisation (Friedman 1987: 119-121). 
Shop floor organisation also forms an important grassroots counterbalance 
to industry wide deals. However, there are indications that some shop 
floor leaders are being targeted by management for promotion, as a means 
of fulfilling affirmative action objectives. 
So while functional shop floor structures have a particularly important 
role at present because of the trends towards centralised bargaining and 
loss of key national leaders to government, it should not be assumed 
that shop floor structures are immune to similar pressures towards 
incorporation and accommodation. 
Democratic practices 
Kighty four percent of shop stewards were elected and 13% were appointed 
by the union (Figure 5). The high proportion of elected shop stewards 
demonstrates a high level of representative democracy being practised 
on the shop floor. 
Figure 5: How Shop Stewards are Appointed 
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The small proportion who were appointed by unions could reflect 
undemocratic practices or early stages of factory organisation, when unions 
on en initially appoint shop stewards to help in recruitment drives and 
01 her basic organisational activities. 
Nearly 60% of respondents had elected their shop stewards within the 
Preceding 12 months, but 12% had only done so more than two years 
previously and 8% had never done so f F i t fu l 
Figure 6: When Last Participated in Shop Steward Elections 
35 f 1 
1/ 
30 r 
25 
0) 
a? 20 
c <B O 
© 15 
a. 
10 
5 
0 
29.7 
7.6 
8.9 
! 1 -H 
1.1 
-ti-
21 
..J 
19.4 
12.3 
rv 
So 
While it seems that a democratic tradition in shop floor structures lias 
persisted, there is a definite component of Cosatu members - 20% - who 
have had little recent involvement in this area of union life. 
Statistical tests revealed that there was some relationship between 
geographic region and participation in shop steward elections, with Wesi cm 
Cape workers being the least likely to have participated. 
Further analysis revealed a highly significant, although somewhat weaker, 
relationship between union membership and participation in shop steward 
elections. 
South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (Sactwu) members 
were least likely to have participated, followed by Samwu and Soulli 
African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saceawti) 
members. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Cosatu workers 
regularly participated in this aspect of union affairs. 
Slightly more than half of shop stewards were elected by secret ballot, 
with most of the remainder elected by show of hands. 
Thus, at least half Cosatu's members are familiar with the procedures 
of voting by secret ballot, representing a firm basis for democratic 
participation politically and in the workplace. 
Mandates and accountability 
When electing shop stewards, 99% of respondents believed they had 
jfiven them a specific mandate to carry out directions from the shop 
lloor, rather than a completely open ended brief. More than two thirds 
also felt political parties should consult supporters over decisions that 
would affect them (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Political Parties Must Consult their Supporters When they make Decisions 
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However, a third in the case of shop stewards and 28% in the case of 
politicians believed this was only necessary as far as important issues 
were concerned. In other words, most saw shop stewards and politicians 
as having rather narrowly defined mandates. 
iMost Cosatu workers also believed in strictly defined notions of 
accountability: 77% believed shop stewards were expected to report back 
to workers every time they acted on behalf of workers. Should they not 
do so, almost all who responded to the question said workers should' 
have the right to dismiss shop stewards. 
Even so, almost a third of respondents had experience of shop stewards 
being dismissed at their current place of employment (Table 1). The 
reasons for the dismissals are not known, but whatever they were the 
results demonstrate that workers do apply their power to dismiss shop 
lloor representatives dppmpH l - - • 
Table 1: Dismissing Shop Stewards 
Yes No No Response 
If a shop steward 
does not represent 
workers, they have 94% 5% 1% 
a right to dismiss her/him. 
Has a shop steward 
ever been dismissed 
by workers at your 31% 68% 1% 
workplace? 
Attendance at union meetings 
Seventy six percent of respondents claimed to have attended at least 
one union meeting within the previous month (Figure 8). On the other 
hand, more than one in 10 had never attended union meetings, indicating 
that they are not formally involved in union affairs. 
Figure 8: Frequency of Attendance at Union Meetings 
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Perhaps, as Pateman (1970: 83) suggests, there may be a link between 
the types of decisions made and the degree of participation. In oilier 
words, there may be a greater willingness to participate in decision making 
if issues covered are of more immediate concern to workers. The extent 
of democratic participation may therefore be affected by whether a union 
has its primary focus on day to day shop floor issues, or on national 
level policy concerns. 
As was suggested by the relatively low level of participation in shop 
.steward elections, it was in the Western Cape that workers were least 
likely to attend union meetings. Meeting attendance was lowest among 
Saccawu, Construction and Allied Workers Union (Cawu) and Chemical 
Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) members. 
Against this must be considered the large deviation in responses among 
CWIU members, with 52% attending meetings on a weekly basis. Even 
among Saccawu and Cawu members a sizeable grouping went to union 
meetings regularly. 
Consequently, there seems to be a high level of participation in union 
affairs among almost all Cosatu affiliates, again indicating that the internal 
democracy characteristic of many of the early independent unions has 
successfully been preserved. 
Participation and democracy 
Participation in union meetings was compared with the method of acquiring 
shop stewards: whether the shop stewards were elected by members or 
appointed by the union. This is particularly important since it reflects 
the relationship between participation and democracy in the union 
movement. 
There was a statistically significant relationship between the two: in 
workplaces where there was a high level of attendance, there were also 
likely to be democratically elected shop stewards. In other words, high 
levels of participation resulted in high levels of union democracy. 
It is possible that the relationship between the two variables is a two 
way one. Workers would be more motivated to participate in union 
structures should democratic practices be the norm, and when it was 
possible for them to have a real impact on union structures. Similarly, 
high levels of attendance at union meetings would make it easier to call 
shop stewards to account and would greatly facilitate the holding of 
regular elections. 
Most workers surveyed reported high levels of shop floor democracy. 
Unions seem indeed fortunate in being in a high participation-high 
democracy cycle. New recruits socialised into such an environment would 
ult imately contribute to its reinforcement. However, the 
democracy-participation cycle could be vulnerable to external pressures, 
such as the need for engagement in wider socio-political issues. 
Length of union membership 
An important question is whether continuing internal democracy is 
associated with recent unionisation. Our analysis of attendance at union 
meetings, by the length of time individuals had been members of the 
union movement, revealed that there was no link between the two. 
However, there was a relationship between workers' attendance at union 
meetings and length of time they had been members of their curreni 
union. It did seem to be the case that workers who joined their current 
union in the late 1980s or early 1990s were more likely to participate 
in union affairs. 
Nonetheless, the most long standing union members still took part in 
union affairs on a regular basis. Thus while high levels of participation 
in union affairs were not confined to those who had most recently joined 
the union movement, those who had been members of the same union 
for a relatively long time were somewhat less likely to attend union 
meetings. 
Tendency towards a democratic culture 
The formation of Cosatu brought together a number of diverse traditions 
of unionism. The process of union unity in fact represented a number 
of coalitions - between unions with different approaches to organisation, 
between different categories of workers, and between political and 
workplace activists. 
Firstly, as noted, it seems that certain unions are marked by lower levels 
of democratic participation than others. Nevertheless, a general tendency 
seems to have been towards a common democratic culture. In view <>1 
the high levels of democratic participation encountered in almost, all 
unions, it seems that it was the participative tradition that dominated 
during the unification and consolidation of the union movement. 
This confirms Erwin's perception that a democratic ethic was established 
in Fosatu unions and that the expectation existed among workers that 
unions ought to be democratic. As Pateman (1990: 104) noted, 'we learn 
to participate by participating*. 
In other words, participation in democratic structures is a self reinforcing 
phenomenon. People socialised in a participative environment are more 
likely to actively participate in the future (Pateman 1990: 105). This 
largely explains the endurance of union shop floor democracy in many 
cases two decades after its inception. 
Challenges facing union democracy 
As Arendt (1965: 218) noted, an initial wave of grassroots collective action, 
although founded on democratic practices, does not always ensure lasting 
accountability and representivity - a phenomenon most evident in the 
Webbs' (1911: 8-26) study of British trade unions. 
Organisations dedicated to change tend to have high levels of democratic 
commitment and practice at their inception. 
But fairly soon this commitment becomes subsumed by the desire to 
ensure organisational stability and continuity (Arendt 1965: 219), which 
can inhibit both internal democracy and the capacity to effectively engage 
in future collective action. 
The democracy versus efficiency dilemma is one of the major tensions 
facing independent unions today. Unlike earlier attempts at mass 
unionisation in South Africa, the independent unions succeeded in 
consolidating early gains and survived periodic bouts of state repression. 
Despite the fact that early shop floor democracy has persisted, questions 
emerge over the relationship between union leaders and their 
constituencies and the possibility of bureaucratisation. 
Many workers have had experience of shop stewards being dismissed 
because they failed to carry out workers' wishes. But it is unclear* how 
far this direct accountability has extended up union structures. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, shop floor democracy has survived a 
gradual process of institutionalisation. But it is evident that a second 
face of unionism has emerged: that of a national level socio-political 
actor entering into coalitions with other kev anWc of ' — ' 
WORKERS AND 
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 
Following its launch in 1985, Cosatu played a key role in the struggle 
to end apartheid and create a new democracy in South Africa. 
In particular, there were two periods when Cosatu effectively assumed 
the leadership of the struggle at the popular level: during the heavy 
state repression of the late 1980s, when the ANC and SACP were si ill 
banned and the UDF was heavily restricted; and during the transition 
from 1990 when the unbanned liberation movements confronted immense 
organisational difficulties. 
Its various mass action campaigns - the 1986 stayaways commemorating 
the 10th anniversary of the Soweto uprising, against deaths in detention, 
and against the repressive intent of the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act of 1988 and other issues - did much to convince national and 
international capital, and the South African and Western governments, 
that apartheid generated more conflict than it did profits. 
Few can doubt that the upsurge of strikes, stayaways, consumer boycotts 
and marches, designed to exact economic and political concessions from 
both capital and the state, raised the costs of continuing to politically 
exclude the black majority to levels unacceptable to those who had until 
then benefited so handsomely from the legalised entrenchment of white 
minority power. 
This in no way suggests that Cosatu alone was responsible for sealing 
the fate of the old order. The ANC's bid to isolate South Africa and the 
launch of its armed struggle predated the formation of Cosatu by decades. 
The white regime's confidence was severely shaken by the Soweto unrest, 
the rise of the UDF in the early 1980s constituted a revival of a mass 
based challenge, and the ANC's associated campaign to render South 
Africa ungovernable melded with changing domestic and international 
circumstances to eventually bring Pretoria to recognise the inevitability 
of change. 
Cosatu emerged as a conscious political actor allied to the UDF in the 
mid-1980s and at the helm of the Mass Democratic Movement in the 
late 1980s. In April 1990, when Cosatu entered into a formal alliance 
with the ANC and SACP to push for a final victory over apartheid, it 
did so as the one partner which at that time possessed a disciplined, 
tried and tested mass organisation on the ground. 
The combined efforts of the liberation forces finally bore fruit. Towards 
the end of 1993, after protracted negotiations between the ruling National 
Party, the ANC and numerous other players, an Interim Constitution 
was agreed by all organisations except the far white right and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP). 
In terms of the agreement, a Government of National Unity would govern 
lor five years and a new parliamentary democratic system would be 
installed. Elections were announced for April 1994 - the first ever in 
South Africa to be conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage. 
Following dramatic concessions by the ANC to both the IFP and the 
Freedom Front, the major umbrella for the white rightwing, which brought 
them both into the electoral process at the 11th hour, the election took 
place as planned - and peacefully - on April 27 and 28. 
T! ic ANC was returned as the leading force in the new, non-racial Parliament 
from which the Government of National Unity was drawn. 
Tims it was that South Africa entered the ranks of the world's democracies. 
Ye I the content of democracy - how it would function in practice, how 
well it would balance majority against minority interests, and how 
representative of their diverse support bases it would allow political parties 
Lo be - was by no means clear under an Interim Constitution whose 
complexities far exceeded the comprehension of ordinary voters. 
li is therefore pertinent to any study of workers' broad political attitudes 
to focus on their understanding of democracy as it relates to the Parliament 
they have helped vote into place. To do this, it is necessary first to paint 
an outline of South Africa's new system of political representation. 
South Africa's new political system 
Agreement was reached, at an early stage of negotiations, that the existing 
'first past the post', constituency based electoral system would be 
abandoned for the country's first fully democratic election, and be replaced 
by proportional representation based on the party list system. 
The 'first past the post' system - under which voters choose between 
individuals to elect a representative of a constituency - had been used 
since 1910 for electing a House of Assembly under the Westminster 
system, and since 1983 for electing the white, coloured and Indian houses 
under the tricameral system. 
It was felt that the 'first past the post' system over represented winners, 
squeezed minorities and encouraged the development of a two party political 
system. In contrast, proportional representation (PR) - under which voters 
choose between lists of candidates drawn up by parties - was seen as 
guaranteeing representation of minorities (Mackenzie 1958). 
The Interim Constitution divided the new South Africa, incorporating the 
old homelands and independent states, into nine new provinces. It also 
outlined a division of concurrent and exclusive powers between central 
and provincial governments, and required a two ballot election. 
The first ballot was to elect 400 members of the National Assembly, 200 
of whom would be drawn proportionately from national party lists and 
200 from provincial party lists, with each province being allocated a 
number of seats proportionate to the size of its population. 
The second ballot was for the legislatures of the nine provinces. Again, 
the number of seats in the legislature varied according to the size of 
the province's population. 
After the elections a Senate was drawn from the nine provincial legislatu res. 
with each providing 10 senators nominated by political parties according 
to their proportionate strength. The overall picture is shown in Tabic 2. 
The new President - which the Interim Constitution stated should be 
the leader of the majority party or a person who could command a 
majority in the Assembly - was elected to head the Government of National 
Unity, whose members were selected from different parties according to 
the proportion of electoral votes they received. 
Provincial premiers were similarly elected by the provincial legislatures, 
and 10 other members of provincial executives were chosen in proporlion 
to the strengths of parties which succeeded in securing at least 10°<) o! 
the vote provincially. 
Table 2: Parliamentary Assemblies in the New South Africa 
Provinces Senate National Assembly Provincial 
National Provincial Legislatures 
Gauteng 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Eastern Cape 
Western Cape 
Northern Tvl 
North West 
Free State 
Eastern Tvl 
Northern Cape 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
43 
40 
28 
21 
20 
15 
15 
14 
4 
86 
81 
56 
42 
40 
30 
30 
30 
30 
Total seats 90 200 200 
South African Council of Churches: South Africa: The Transition to Democracy (1994: 25) 
The new system of representation emerged from the cut and thrust of 
hard fought negotiation by party elites. It thus owed little to popular 
input, and little effort was made by parties to determine the views of 
their followers on constitutional issues. 
Our analysis of workers' political attitudes, and most notably of their 
conception of democracy, may contribute to an understanding of the 
new system's capacity for securing popular legitimacy. It may also indicate 
whether changes should be made to a final Constitution to bring 
government closer to the people. 
The participatory approach to democracy 
Two of the core findings which emerged from the survey concerned: the 
manner in which shop floor experiences have been instrumental in shaping 
the version of democracy embraced by most Cosatu workers, and the 
way in which this conception has been transferred reflexively into the 
political arena. 
As indicated previously, Cosatu workers are not only familiar with the 
tenets of a particular version of shop floor democracy, they actually 
practise it as well. So on the one hand we see that most Cosatu workers 
subscribe to democratic principles that include: 
Provision for the regular election of representatives who are thereby 
mandated to act on behalf of the membership. 
rap An obligation on the part of those elected to consult members on all 
issues that affect them. 
» The duty of representatives to account to members for their actions 
at all times. 
Provision for the recall of elected representatives who are deemed 
not to have adhered to their mandates, or who have otherwise 
legitimately incurred the displeasure of those who put them into 
office. 
On the other hand, we see that these are not merely principles that 
exist in the abstract: the vast majority of respondents had recently 
participated in the election of shop stewards and had also attended regular 
meetings at which shop stewards had reported back on their activities. 
Most Cosatu members surveyed have had tangible experience of 
representative accountability that must surely have been reinforced by 
the fact that fully a third of them work in plants where shop stewards 
have been dismissed by workers for not performing their role satisfactorily. 
This commitment to grassroots democracy is hardly surprising. The history 
of the independent, non-racial labour movement is synonymous with 
attempts to implement procedures that facilitate some measure of 
organisational control from below (Friedman 1987: 86-100). 
Indeed, many of the old Fosatu unions recruited their members more 
on the virtues of participatory democracy than the promise of this or 
that material benefit. And they made strenuous efforts to practise what 
they preached, even if it is true that different unions did so with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness (MacShane, Plaut and Ward 
1984: 38-42, 65-74; Webster 1984). 
The commitment of the labour movement has enabled most established 
Cosatu unions to root themselves firmly in the workplace. However, what 
emerged from the survey is that the vigorous culture of shop floor 
democracy has translated into a rather similar understanding of the 
new parliamentary political system. 
Our data shows, for instance, that most respondents - 68% - believe 
that the election of political parties imposes a duty on them to consult 
and report back to their supporters on all issues: in other words, to 
Figure 9 When Making Decisions, Political Parties Must Report Back 
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render themselves accountable in eveiy instance where parliamentary 
decisions affect supporters' interests (Figure 9). 
Moreover, the vast majority of Cosatu workers appear to hold the view 
that if political parties stray from their mandates, they should be subject 
to immediate recall by the people who elected them. 
This is highly problematic for any form of parliamentary system, and no 
less for South Africa under the Interim Constitution. Let us begin by 
addressing the question of mandates, and then examine other aspects 
of this participatory approach to democracy. 
Blondel (1990: 346-348) proposes that the 'theory of the mandate' is 
predicated on four assumptions. They are that: 
<sp Political parties are disciplined. This situation occurs in most but by 
no means all Western systems. » 
m Voting has to be related to programmes, either on the basis of choices 
on major issues or through ranking issues. However, voting studies 
show that electors relate to images rather than issues. 
csr The battle between political parties is balanced. Yet where there are 
more than two parties or when one party is permanently disadvantaged, 
as in a dominant party system, the scope for competitive mobilisation 
is impaired. 
Figure 10: When Choosing to Vote for a Political Party the Most Important Thing is: 
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"5s Competition between political parties' alternative programmes is clear 
cut. However, the constraints of two or multi-party systems often 
encourage 'reconciliation' rather than 'mobilisation'. 
Given these assumptions, it is evident that the idea of the mandate is 
as yet only very uncertainly applicable in the new South Africa. Nor is 
it apparent that if it was, it would necessarily serve worker interests. 
Regarding the first assumption, parties in the new Parliament may prove 
to be disciplined, not least because the Interim Constitution requires 
parliamentarians who change party allegiance to resign, and their places 
to be taken up by nominees from their original party. 
This implies that dissidents expelled from their parties will be forced out 
of Parliament. In practice the extent to which parties such as the ANC, 
which are formally committed to open debate, will exercise such strict 
discipline remains to be seen. 
In any case, one of the most common criticisms of list system proportional 
representation is precisely that it empowers party managers and enables 
them to quell dissidents. If such dissidents were articulating labour based 
concerns, is their suppression what Cosatu workers would want to happei r.' 
On the second assumption - that voting has to be related to programmes 
- the 1994 ballot was for most Africans a liberation election, broadly 
construed as bringing freedom from oppression (Southall 1994). 
Figure 11: Knowledge of the RDP 
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Most respondents - 80% - indicated that they would vote for a political 
party because of its policies rather than its leadership (Figure 10). Relatively 
few - 24% - knew anything about the RDP, which was a major plank 
of the Alliance's programme and was principally drawn up by Cosatu 
(Figure 11). 
It was also suggested by well over half - 61% - of our respondents that 
they had in no way been influenced in their voting intention by any 
trade union election campaign (Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Decision to Vote for a Political Party Affected by Union Campaigns 
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This may point to a deficiency in the ANC's election campaign or in 
Cosatu's political education, but does it not also suggest that the majority 
of workers who went on to vote for the ANC were guided by the latter's 
image? And if, in future, workers continue to allocate their votes like 
voters elsewhere - by image rather than by policy - will they not become 
victim to the wiles of the image makers (Saatchi and Saatchi rather than 
Marx and Engels)? 
Regarding the third assumption on which the theory of the mandate is 
based - that the battle between political parties is balanced - the point 
should be made that the election gave the ANC a strong 63% majority 
at the national level, and effective control of seven out of the nine provinces. 
Despite numerous protections for minorities built into the Interim 
Constitution, and the opportunities for representation provided by PR, 
there are good grounds for believing that the new South Africa will develop 
into a system dominated by one party, effectively entrenching the ANC 
in power beyond the next and successive elections (Southall 1994). 
This could prove beneficial to worker interest if under the ANC unions 
are not systematically subordinated to other concerns. However, as a 
dominant party, the ANC would have to respond to demands from diverse 
sources of support, and consequently its actions could well conflict with 
what workers' interpret as the mandate they have given it. 
The fourth assumption, that competition between political parties' 
programmes is clear cut, was true for the 1994 elections, which offered 
voters a clear choice between the ANC - 'liberation' and the planning 
strategy of the RDP - versus the National Party and its association with 
past repression and its discovery of free market economics. 
However, the dynamics of a Government of National Unity and of Hie 
ANC's commitments to nation building, development and national 
reconciliation, may well lead to fewer policy choices in later elections. 
If we add to the above considerations the fact that the double ballot for 
elections at national and provincial levels allows voters to 'split their 
tickets', it becomes clear that workers' strong commitment to the conception 
of a mandate has to be filtered through many complications. 
So many, perhaps, that it is doubtful whether the many lessons about 
democracy Cosatu workers have learned in the workplace are capable 
of being transferred to the political arena. Unless we recognise that what 
appears at first sight a rather naive notion of direct democracy actually 
constitutes elements of a more complex idea. 
Towards participatory democracy 
The survey showed that Cosatu workers expect the political party they 
elect to consult them on all issues that affect them and to report back 
on all related decisions. If the party does not do what its supporters 
require of it, it should be subject to recall. 
Despite their lack of classical learning, the version of democracy practised 
by trade unionists affiliated to Cosatu might appear to be inspired by 
the ancient Greek conception of the polis. 
Discounting the foundation of the Greek model upon the subordination 
of women and the general conditions of small city states and a slave 
economy, workers might seem to adhere to a form of direct democracy 
in which members exercise their equality and rights of self governance 
by gathering in open meetings to manage their own affairs, and in which 
officials enjoy no distinctions or privilege (Held 1987: 34). 
However, this analogy is more misleading than it is helpful, for such a 
model has never been adopted by the unions and would scarcely succeed 
if attempts were ever made to do so. It would fail for precisely the same 
reasons that direct democracy has typically foundered in any system or 
organisation that exceeds a certain critical mass in both its membership 
and functions. 
As argued by David Held (1987: 279), the Athenian model cannot be 
adapted to stretch across space and time, for the problems posed by 
coordination and regulation in circumstances that are socially, 
economically and politically differentiated need complicated solutions. 
The size and complexity of organisations militates against the successful 
implementation of direct democracy for two reasons. In the first place, 
beyond a certain point it becomes physically impossible to bring all 
members together in one place to participate directly in managing their 
common affairs. 
Secondly, when the internal and external functions of the organisation 
are such that its ability to perform requires a considerable level of expertise. 
it is not feasible to endow the entire membership with a sufficient level 
of competence to render each perfectly interchangeable with the other. 
What tends to happen, instead, is that expertise in managing the affairs 
of the organisation becomes possessed by a few individuals who then 
entrench their leadership by restricting access to those skills. 
In short, as elaborated among others by Michels (1962), at the beginning 
of the 20th Century the iron laws of functional efficiency gave rise to 
oligarchic tendencies even within organisations like socialist political 
parties and trade unions, which deemed themselves to be committed to 
democracy. 
As mentioned, this oligarchic tendency is already visible in Cosatu. Our 
data clearly shows that while rank and file members often exercise some 
control over shop stewards, the decisions for which shop stewards arc 
accountable generally relate exclusively to matters arising on the factory 
floor. 
But similar powers of censure do not seem to extend to officials higher 
up in union structures, or within Cosatu itself, so that rank and file 
members appear to have minimal say in decision making processes of 
a broad economic and political nature. 
This point is starkly illustrated by the fact that few respondents even 
knew what the National Manpower Commission or the National Economic 
Forum were, to say nothing of their ignorance about the allegedly 'popular' 
RDP. 
Not only were rank and file members not consulted on these matters 
by 'senior' representatives, but very few of them had attended report 
back meetings where the rationale behind the formulation of these forums 
and programmes had been mentioned, let alone explained. 
As observed, despite the fact that direct democracy is not feasible within 
large scale organisations, there is something in its spirit that has always 
appealed to Cosatu affiliates. In particular, the notion of active participation 
in the running of unions has resonated with a broad ideological inclination 
to counter bureaucratic authoritarianism with a substantial measure of 
control from below. 
In practice, this has meant that Cosatu unions have acknowledged the 
seemingly unavoidable limitations of direct democracy, and opted instead 
for a version where the interests of their members are mediated through 
the offices of regularly elected representatives. 
Thus, although members are one or more steps removed from decision 
making processes, their participation in governance is supposedly assured 
by their representatives being always bound to adhere to the mandates 
conferred on them in the electoral process. 
This is the raison d'etre for union procedures that compel representatives 
to consult their constituencies on a regular basis, report back to them 
and be removed if they are deemed remiss in performing their duties. 
Cosatu workers, in short, operate on the basis of something approaching 
what Held calls 'participatory democracy'. 
Aimed at nurturing a concern for collective problems and forming a 
knowledgeable citizenry capable of being involved in the governing process, 
Held (1987: 262) writes that participatory democracy at national level 
would require: 
os- Direct participation by citizens in the regulation of key institutions, 
including the workplace and local community. 
Accountability of party officials to their members. 
rap The operation of 'participatory' parties in parliamentary or 
congressional structures. 
rap Maintaining an open institutional system - in which, for instance, 
public officials are as accountable to those below as to those above 
them - to ensure possibility of experimentation with political forms. 
All this may not be fully developed in workers' own conceptions of 
democracy. But they are substantially different to the notion of democracy 
which underwrites the Interim Constitution. 
Participatory versus parliamentary democracy? 
• ™ 1 * — • % 
Cosatu workers' commitment to a (undeveloped) version of participatory 
democracy contrasts markedly with the notion of indirect democracy on 
which the Interim Constitution is based. This is a particularly limited 
version of representative parliamentary democracy. 
The theoretical origins of the parliamentary democracy of South Africa 
today reflect the tortured compromises nut of — -- <~-- 1 T T 
we can identify three key aspects of its peculiar blend, each rooted in 
the broad framework of liberal democracy (Southall 1993). 
Firstly, there is the commitment to majority rule, which the ANC and 
other parties developed as much from liberalism's language of individual 
rights as it did from notions of self determination. From the momenl of 
its formation in 1912, the ANC focused on extending full citizenship (n 
all South Africans, regardless of their colour, and thereby transforming 
Parliament into a genuine congress for all people. 
Secondly, there is a large dose of 'consociationalism', which as defined 
by Lijphart (1977) - and absorbed especially by the National Party -
entails, among other things: 
i®1 Government by a grand coalition of political leaders of all significani 
segments of a plural society. 
i®" The mutual veto, or concurrent majority principle, designed to protect 
vital minority interests. 
us* Proportionality as the principle standard of political representation. 
rar A high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own affairs. 
Finally, the Interim Constitution embeds principles of protective democracy 
- prompted mostly by the Democratic Party but increasingly towards I he 
latter stages of negotiations by the National Party - which, according to 
Held (1987: 70) emphasise that: 
Sovereignty ultimately lies in the people, but is delegated lo 
representatives. 
eg" Accountability is provided by periodic elections and competition 
between parties. 
w State powers should be limited and impersonal, and divided between 
the executive, legislature and judiciary. 
us- Competing power centres and pressure groups should be encouraged 
to provide a pole of countervailing power to the state. 
The combination of diverse elements of these different approaches lo 
democracy resulted in a new political dispensation which systematically 
and deliberately limits the exercise of popular power - as, of course, did 
that first great modern constitution drawn up by the Founding Fa I hers 
in the United States in 1787. 
These limitations are embodied in all the numerous provisions which 
seek to contain the writ of government by majority: for instance, the 
division of sovereignty between Parliament and the Constitutional Court, 
proportionality between parties in the formation of the Government of 
National Unity and provincial cabinets, and not least, the division of 
powers between central and provincial governments. 
The very idea of voters entrusting a government with a mandate under 
this system is highly problematic. So while political parties and politicians 
will undoubtedly explain their actions by claiming to be doing what the 
people want, they will in reality be subject only to rather remote popular 
control. 
Rather than being mandated, the majority ANC component of the new 
Government has secured a much broader, generalised right to govern. 
It is in no way bound to consult the electorate or report back to voters, 
or in any way be held accountable for its actions, save for the distant 
prospect of rejection in the next elections. 
We see, therefore, that a key difference between the notion of democracy 
embraced by Cosatu members and that advocated as the new hegemony 
turns on the question of the autonomy of parliamentary representatives. 
On the one hand, the participatory approach of Cosatu workers would 
limit the freedom of political representatives to interpret the national 
interest by requiring them to consult with the electorate on a regular 
basis and holding them immediately accountable for failure to do so. 
On the other hand, the dominant view sees democracy as a process of 
electing leaders who, while being constrained by the Interim Constitution, 
are otherwise free to interpret the national interest as they see fit. 
From this perspective, participation in decision making effectively starts 
and ends with elections. What happens in between is effectively the 
prerogative of Members of Parliament and the Interim Constitution, and 
not the people who elected them. , 
This latter points deserves elaboration, for as implied by earlier discussion 
around the issue of the mandate, the combination of list system PR and 
the constitutional restriction on Members of Parliament crossing the floor 
adds considerably to the autonomy of parties by insulating them from 
interned dissidence. 
Thus, if an individual representative preferred some or other popular 
interpretation of the national interest to that of his or her party, there 
would be no opportunity to align him or herself with the wishes of the 
people. 
To this may be added the consideration that the abolition of parliamentary 
constituencies, as existed under the 'first past the post' system, at one 
stroke removed the direct connection which was supposed to exist between 
voters and their local Member of Parliament. 
Of course, the election of 200 parliamentarians from provincial lists is 
clearly intended to provide a cohort of members who will be particularly 
responsive to regional interests. 
Similarly, post-election action by the ANC which has seen allocation of 
local area responsibilities to individual members arises from concern 
that the link between voters and their representatives has been broken. 
But unless parties, and the ANC particularly, open themselves up to a 
much higher level of internal participation, not least concerning the 
selection of candidates and their position on party lists, what has been 
gained on the roundabouts for voters in terms of proportional 
representation - 'every vote counts' and guaranteed minority representation 
- may be lost on the swings, in increased control for party bosses. 
It must be stressed that the contradiction between Cosatu workers' notion 
of participatory democracy and the Interim Constitution's embodiment 
of parliamentary democracy, is latent. 
Our data does not indicate that Cosatu workers are aware of any 
disjuncture between their democratic vision and the aspirations of the 
new order. There seems to be an assumption that the electoral process 
is designed to confer mandates on parties, with all the implications of 
constant consultancy and report back that this implies. 
Cosatu workers seemed convinced that because the new Parliament is 
the first to be constituted on the basis of universal adult suffrage and 
thus the first to comprise members who are there as formally representative 
of all people, it will be an effective forum - or even the best forum - for 
redressing the injustices of the past and pursuing the interests of workers. 
Since this is so, the ANC - as the leading force in the struggle against 
apartheid and the leading element in the Government of National Unity 
- may well enjoy a longer honeymoon with organised labour than many 
commentators expect. 
If the contradiction between the two views of democracy becomes manifest 
during the five years in which the Interim Constitution operates, positive 
sentiments on the part of workers may prove merely to be an endorsement 
of the first Parliament of national liberation. 
In that case, workers' pursuit of the politics of national liberation might 
be replaced by a politics of class. At this stage, however, Cosatu workers 
seem to find no clear distinction between the two types of agenda. 
Workers, democracy and nation building 
Cosatu workers may support a Parliament of national liberation, but 
they nevertheless operate with complex and fluid notions of their own 
identities. 
In some situations, notably those closely related to point of production 
issues and conditions under which their labour is bought and deployed, 
they seem to think of themselves unambiguously as workers with specific 
class interests. 
But in other circumstances, especially when they step outside the factory 
gates into larger arenas of community, regional and national politics, 
their working class self images seem to be subsumed under or equated 
with a broader South African identity. 
Put rather differently, they either see themselves as South Africans first 
and workers later, or draw no distinction between being a worker and 
being a South African. 
Evidence of this was seen in Cosatu workers' responses to being asked 
whether a party which had won working class support in the election 
should represent only workers, or should take cognisance of other interests 
as well. 
/ 
Overwhelmingly, respondents expressed a deep seated commitment to 
the nation building politics of the Tripartite Alliance in which their interests 
as workers would either be given only parity with - 62% - or would be 
subordinated to - 32% - the interests of other classes or the nation as 
a whole (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: If the Majority of a Party's Supporters are Workers, it Must Represent 
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In this respect, Cosatu members seem to be as reluctant as then-
counterparts in most other countries to systematically disentangle their 
class from their national identities. 
This would seem to be good news for the ANC which, as leader of a 
multi-class alliance charged with governmental responsibilities, clearly 
has a crucial stake in ideologically asserting the supremacy of national 
interest over sectional interests - especially sectional interests with as 
much disruptive potential as a working class organised by Cosatu. 
It may be that in the interests of maintaining the unity of the Alliance, 
neither Cosatu nor the SACP found it strategically appropriate to clarify 
distinctions between working class and national identities in the build 
up to the election. 
But now that the ANC has secured itself as the leading force in the 
Government of National Unity, this could be set to change. On the one 
hand, it seems likely that Cosatu and/or the SACP will turn their attention 
to constructing a more socialist consciousness among the working class. 
On the other hand, even if such a project is postponed in favour of 
continuing to promote an uncomplicated agenda of nation building under 
the ANC, there is no guarantee that the contradiction between class and 
national interests will not become explicit. 
This becomes clearer when we examine closely workers' views of relations 
between trade unions and worker based political parties. 
Workers, unions and parties 
Some 95% of those surveyed felt that a mainly - but not exclusively -
worker backed political party should represent the interests of more than 
just the working class. 
Yet workers were considerably divided in their responses to another 
question: some 50% agreed and 37% disagreed with the proposition that 
workers cannot rely on political parties to protect their interests (Figure 
14). 
Figure 14: Workers Cannot Rely on Political Parties to Protect Their Interests 
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In contrast, there was virtual unanimity - 95% - that workers will always 
need trade unions to protect their interests, and high support - 80%4 ; 
for the view that a strong presence of former trade unionists in a 
parliamentary caucus would be the best way of ensuring that a political 
party kept worker interests at heart (Figure 15). 
This question was posed because of the 20 prominent Cosatu trade 
unionists, headed by former secretary general Jay Naidoo, who resigned 
from Cosatu to stand for the ANC in the elections. 
Figure 15: Many Worker Representatives Ensure Parties Look After Worker Interests 
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It also followed hard upon a long standing debate in at least the upper 
reaches of Cosatu about how many hats trade unionists could legitimately 
wear in the Tripartite Alliance. In other words, if they held office in 
either the ANC or SACP, could trade union office bearers simultaneously 
and uninhibitedly represent Cosatu? 
Even within the Alliance, would there not be a conflict of interest? And 
if there was, would not such a conflict be more acute if trade unionists 
were translated into parliamentarians who would be constantly assailed 
to consider national rather than sectional concerns? (National Union of 
Mineworkers of South Africa 1990; Zikalala 1991). 
Our respondents' overwhelming support for trade unions is remarkable, 
even though our sample was drawn exclusively from Cosatu trade 
unionists. Given that real average wage levels declined during the transition 
from 1990, it would not have been at all surprising if workers had 
privately expressed some doubt about the utility of their union membership. 
That they expressed such confidence in the need for trade unions seems 
to reflect an understanding of unions as agencies of a wider liberal ion. 
as having played a vital role in the struggle against apartheid. 
The workers we surveyed viewed their unions as involved in more than 
just an economic battle, reflecting the social movement character of Cosalu 
unionism that has prevailed since its inception a decade ago. 
From the outset, Cosatu had to perform functions that far exceeded 
those normally associated with trade unions. While it obviously devoted 
much of its energies to advancing the economic interests of its members, 
it did so not merely by employing strategies classically adopted by unions 
everywhere - combining negotiations with militancy as was deemed 
appropriate - but also by mobilising around wider community concerns. 
In a period of massive state assault upon explicitly political organisations 
such as the UDF, trade unions - and Cosatu in particular - as supposedly 
economic organisations which enjoyed the significant support of the 
international labour movement, were compelled to step out into the political 
arena. 
Workers came increasingly to view economic and political oppression as 
simultaneous, with the result that trade unions became inextricably 
engaged in struggle on both fronts. 
For its part Cosatu proved, by its early acknowledgement of the ANC's 
leading political role, that it was 'merely' a trade union federation and 
had no intention of replacing the ANC as a movement of liberation. 
However, by its involvement in the Alliance after the politics of transition 
began and the ANC resumed leadership of the struggle inside the country, 
Cosatu also stated that it remained committed to pursuing an agenda 
which did not construe workers' interests in narrowly economic terms. 
What is interesting is that Cosatu workers share this conception, and 
that they trust the ability of leaders from a trade union background to 
pursue worker interests from within the ANC and Parliament. Or at 
least, they indicated that a party with a body of former trade unionists 
in it was more likely to promote worker interests than a party without 
one. 
Here, it seems, we get echoes of workers' faith in the notion of a mandate 
- despite the fact that, unlike in Britain, where trade unions directly, 
sponsor and put forward to constituencies a number of Labour Pdrty 
Members of Parliament, there is no formal connection devised to provide 
for dual representation. 
While in Britain, Labour MPs remain members of and acknowledge 
connection to their unions, and are put there explicitly to protect and 
promote trade union interests (Coates andTopham 1982: 304-3081. former 
Cosatu narliamo^t— 
It may be that this lack of organic connection between Cosatu and the 
ANC in Parliament will ultimately lead to workers doubting the commitment 
of political parties - even those with strong worker backing - to protect 
working class interests. 
A significant proportion of our respondents evinced unease over whether 
even hardened trade unionists, when removed from the grime of the 
factory to the heady air of Parliament, would retain loyalty to their political 
origins for long. 
This is, of course, consistent with workers' insistence on accountability 
and their leaning towards participatory democracy. But it also poses 
immense challenges to Cosatu concerning how it thinks it will, in the 
new era of liberation politics, operationalise its commitment to social 
transformation. 
Workers, democracy and social transformation 
The Interim Constitution provides for South Africa to be ruled by a 
multi-party Government of National Unity for five years, during which 
time a new and final Constitution will be adopted by a Constituent 
Assembly. The final Constitution will operate after the next general election. 
However, since it was agreed during negotiations that the principles of 
the Interim Constitution would provide a basis for the final Constitution, 
it appears that the Constitutional Assembly will not do much more than 
tinker with the present arrangement. 
This suggests that the principles of representative parliamentary democracy 
currently applied in South Africa and extended down to local government 
level, are bound to become hegemonic, although the forms - such as 
the electoral system - may be amended. 
If we are correct in identifying worker respondents as being disposed 
towards a nascent form of participatory rather than representative 
democracy, it will obviously pose a challenge to Cosatu - and especially 
trade unionists elected to national Parliament and regional assemblies. 
In short, because Cosatu's social movement character has imparted to 
it a leadership role among the dispossessed, it should become Cosatu's 
particular task to broaden the base of consultation in a way which renders 
the new political system responsive to the needs and wishes not just of 
civil society and trade unions but also all those whom apartheid 
disempowered. This challenge will require Cosatu to pose a number of 
critical strategic questions: 
rap Should it continue its membership of the Alliance in the hope of 
delivering what workers expect from the new democracy? 
US' Should it break from the Alliance on the grounds that the ANC, as 
the leading force in government compelled to engage in continuing 
compromise with non-popularly based domestic and international 
forces, will need to become subject to external, popularly based counter 
pressures to keep it accountable to the mass of ordinary South Africans 
who elected it? 
is- Should Cosatu end its alliance with the ANC, the party of nation, 
but retain its alliance to the SACP, the party of class? Or should it 
align to some other political party of the left? Or should it attempt 
with other unions to create a new workers' party, free of the Stalinist 
baggage which many claim the SACP is unable to leave behind? 
ts- Should Cosatu detach itself from all political parties and devote its 
energies and considerable organisational muscle to the task of 
democratising the political economy from below? 
is- Should Cosatu consider whether a genuinely participatory democracy 
is attainable within the confines of bourgeois liberal democracy. And 
if it concludes that it is not, should it not commit itself to a revolutionary 
socialist objective? 
It is important to appreciate that these are not questions plucked out 
of thin air: they have all been debated at some length within Cosatu 
and among other forums of the South African left (Pillay 1990; Von Holdt 
1991; Mboweni 1992; Erwin 1994). 
There cannot be amy attempt made here to prescribe what Cosatu should 
do. However, what can be legitimately offered are suggestions about what 
our respondents would seem to be saying about various options on offer. 
The good news for the ANC is that the survey demonstrates Cosatu 
workers' overwhelming support, for the moment at least, for the new 
Parliament, for the Government of National Unity and for continuing the 
Tripartite Alliance. 
With such familiar and experienced Cosatu warriors as Ministers Alec 
Erwin and Jay Naidoo entrusted with key portfolios which refer directly 
to workers' well being, our survey indicates what we already know from 
the result of the election: that the new Government is the embodiment 
of immense popular trust and expectation. 
It can be said with equal confidence that the survey offers no support 
at all for those who would like to see Cosatu, whether from inside or 
outside government, adopt a revolutionary socialist objective. 
This finding is also an endorsement of the election result, which registered 
a derisory level of support for parties of the far left like the Workers List 
Party, which failed to secure a single representative nationally or in the 
provinces in which it stood. 
As the SACP acknowledged in its decision that members who stood for 
Parliament should do so as belonging to the ANC, the commitment of 
workers - and others oppressed by apartheid - was primarily to (lie 
politics of national liberation and only secondarily to the politics of 
socialism. And that was, after all, what the SACP's two stage theory of 
securing democracy before proceeding to socialism, was all about. 
What the survey says about other options is discussed in greater detail 
in the following chapters. But there is little doubt that the survey revealed 
tendential opposition between workers' orientation to participatory 
democracy and the reality of the new South Africa, which embodies Hie 
more indirect form of representative democracy. 
Were such a clash to become explicit, one or a mix of three outcomes 
would probably eventuate. Firstly, as in many other liberal democracies, 
workers would become depoliticised if not alienated, and would leave 
the arena of politics to be dominated by other classes. Secondly, they 
would attempt to render representative democracy more participatory. 
And thirdly, they would gravitate by stages to a revolutionary agenda. 
We now turn to a more extended discussion of what the survey has to 
say about workers' attitudes to Cosatu's involvement in policy making 
and to the future role of trade unions. 
COSATU AND THE RDP 
In post-independence Africa the state became the central arena for 
international and local business interests and other parties to pursue 
their goals in the civic and private spheres. Political and administrative 
positions became strategic sites for acquiring material resources and 
controlling or regulating economic opportunities. 
The state came to see itself as the main vehicle for development, invoking 
the notion of 'national development' to justify its management of the 
economy (Dutkiewicz and Williams 1987: 41). The state in effect became 
a growth industry, with the extended bureaucracy offering a means of 
providing for and controlling the appointment of followers and retainers 
(Hyden 1983: 41). 
The widened scope of state activities was accompanied by an increase 
in claims made on the state by a wide variety of clients. The range of 
activities the state was supposed to be responsible for placed a growing 
strain on its administrative and financial resources. 
Recourse was usually made to skilled foreign manpower - expensive 
'experts' - and additional funds for development had to be found. Foreign 
aid helped in this and in other respects, with the consequent growth of 
the 'development state' (Dutkiewicz and Williams 1987: 42). 
A number of scholars have commented on the way development planning 
became an almost ritualistic exercise. Acting on the implicit belief that 
rational control over the economic environment is possible, leaders of 
newly developed states in Africa began to engage in planning mostly in 
good faith. Hyden (1983) describes this emphasis on planning as the 
'blueprint' approach to development. 
Some decades ago the distinguished European philosopher, Karl Popper, 
coined the term 'piecemeal social engineering'. Popper's intention was to 
articulate a practical and democratic alternative to the Utopian blueprints 
of the people he derided as 'holistic planners' - especially those of fascist 
or Stalinist orientation. 
To Popper, piecemeal social engineering was the policy practice appropriate 
to decentralised political systems, whereas holistic large scale change 
was the hallmark of authoritarian systems (Popper 1945). 
A number of commentators have implied that the ANC's Reconstruction 
and Development Programme is a Utopian blueprint, drawn up by the 
equivalent of Popper's 'holistic planners'. They argue that the RDP relies 
too much on a strong centralised state. They believe it is likely to reproduce 
features of the over blown post-colonial state. 
Others argue that while the RDP is clearly a visionary document, the 
programme is not statist - although it does not believe that the legacy 
of apartheid can be overcome by mere piecemeal and marginal changes 
to the status quo. 
Rather, the programme's authors believe a radical change of South African 
society is needed. But while the goals are radical their approach lo 
change is not revolutionary. Some have called this approach structural 
reform, others have called it radical reform (Saul 1991; Adler and Webster 
1995). 
/ The foundations of this alternative approach to policy formulation were 
laid in the early 1990s, most particularly when Cosatu began to participalc 
in tripartite structures and a range of national forums. However, Cosatu's 
involvement in such a planning exercise raised complex questions. 
,/ It is widely believed, for instance, that as trade unions become drawn 
into policy making their leadership tends to become distanced from ils 
base. 
/ How can distanced leaders be made accountable to grassroots members'.'' 
How is it possible to prevent the 'democratic rupture' that often 
accompanies involvement in corporatist tripartite arrangements between 
capital, labour and the state? Do unions have the capacity to engage in 
policy making? 
In this section of the study we analyse the views of respondents to union 
involvement in policy making. Our results show some indication of a 
'democratic rupture' between the growing involvement of the union 
movement in policy making and rank and file members. 
These findings are a major challenge to those who believe in the goal 
of participatory and non-statist development. 
The National Manpower Commission 
One of the first signs of this shift to a new approach to policy making 
was the involvement of Cosatu in attempts to restructure the former 
National Manpower Commission (NMC). 
Through the Laboria Minute of September 1990, the NMC was restructured 
to make it more representative of trade unions and employers rather 
than selected academic and state employees. 
Cosatu conceived of the NMC as a national bargaining forum where 
labour policies and legislation would become the responsibility of employers 
and unions rather than the state alone. 
This goal was achieved when the NMC merged with the National Economic 
Forum in early 1995, creating the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (Nedlac), a multi-partite body consisting of organised 
labour, organised employees, communities, and government. 
The central objective of Nedlac is for these four mandated constituencies 
to reach consensus on economic and social policy before it is debated 
in Parliament. 
But the goal of corporatist style decision making was not without problems, 
as one participant recalls: 
'The Federation's infrastructure, the state of development of its 
affiliates, and its general shortage of skills and resources made 
principled engagement difficult at times...As the events speeded 
up in the last months of the campaign (to restructure the NMC) 
and as procedures, schedules and agendas became more complex, 
our information flow bogged down. Many workers lost touch with 
actual developments." (Schreiner 1991: 40) 
Concern over Cosatu's capacity to participate in complex negotiations in 
tripartite institutions was confirmed by the abortive lock out strike in 
October 1993. ' 
A dispute arose when Cosatu representatives agreed in the NMC to a 
compromise in which the right of workers to strike would be entrenched 
in the Interim Constitution, while employers would have the right to 
lock out employees on strike. 
By writing both rights into the Bill of Rights, Cosatu representatives 
believed that unions would have something to gain (the right to strike 
which they did not have as employers could dismiss workers during a 
strike) and nothing to lose (employers already had the right to lock out). 
At the Cosatu Executive Committee meeting that month, however, a number 
of unionists objected to a lock out clause in the Bill of Rights, arguing 
that it was a fundamental attack on worker rights. 
It was decided to call a general strike unless Cosatu's objections to the 
lock out clause were met. Cosatu was eventually forced to back down 
when employers refused to budge. Employers' ability to lock out and 
workers' right to strike both remained in the interim Bill of Rights (Von 
Holdt 1993). Both of these provisions were included in the Draft Labour 
Relations Bill published in February 1995. 
The 1993 strike underlined the problems of relations between negotiators 
and the constitutional structures of Cosatu. There was seldom time during 
NMC negotiations for delegates to meet with the leadership and membership 
of Cosatu to discuss issues. 
In this incident the NMC delegate had to rely on discussions with Cosatu's 
legal advisers, where a compromise was agreed. But the delegate failed 
to inform Cosatu's Executive Committee of his discussions and the fact, 
that he had supported the compromise in the NMC. 
Figure 16: Knowledge of the National Manpower Commission 
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Lack of adequate mandating and report back was confirmed in our survey. 
Most workers interviewed had never had report backs on Cosatu's 
involvement in the NMC. Indeed, 75% did not know what the NMC was 
(Figure 16). 
These results raise fundamental questions about the capacity of Cosatu 
to participate effectively in other forums, such as the National Housing 
Forum, the National Education and Training Forum and various regional 
development and local government forums. 
If Cosatu could not ensure adequate mandating and report back in a 
forum which was directly concerned with worker interests, how could it 
avoid the same problem in other forums? 
National Economic Forum / 
Similar problems to those experienced by Cosatu in its involvement in 
the former NMC emerged with regard to the former National Economic 
Forum (NEF). 
Launched in November 1992, the NEF was a permanent tripartite forum 
to negotiate economic policy. The original proposals for the forum were 
put forward by Cosatu in the wake of the massive stayaway protesting 
the unilateral introduction of VAT in November 1991. 
Initially Cosatu saw the NEF as a negotiating body where formal binding 
agreements would be reached between representatives of state, business 
and labour. This view was not generally accepted in the NEF, with the 
state arguing that Parliament was sovereign in determining government 
policy. The ANC shared this view and argued that the NEF was a multipartite 
advisory body where organs of civil society could participate in and 
influence policy making. 
Given the ambiguous attitude of the state to the NEF, Cosatu had to 
contribute a significant proportion of its resources in an effort to maintain 
the policy making forum. It also had to draw its membership into debates 
around economic policy formulation. ? 
Our survey shows that did not happen. Of 620 respondents, only 120 
knew what the NEF was. Indeed, fewer than 15% had ever been at a 
union meeting where there had been discussions on the NEF (Figure 
17). When questioned about whether they knew of other forums Cosatu 
was sitting on, only 17% answered in the affirmative fFiunrp isi 
Figure 17: Been to Union Meeting Where Report-back on NEF 
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It appears that the bulk of Cosatu's members did not know of their 
organisation's involvement in a multitude of forums. 
This despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of respondents felt 
it would not be possible for the Government to make policies affecting 
workers without consulting them - and that they had high expectations 
of an ANC government bringing them more than just political liberation. 
This brings us to the RDP. 
Figure 18: Know any other Forum the Union May Sit on 
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T h e RDP 
Five principles underlie the economic and political philosophy of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC 1994). They are: 
I-*- That the legacy of apartheid cannot be overcome in a piecemeal fashion. 
It requires coordinated policies. 
That its point of departure is people's basic needs. 
t®* That the massive divisions in our society require nation building. 
bp That growth and redistribution are interdependent. 
That those four principles are dependent on a thoroughgoing 
deniocratisation of South Africa. 
The last principle points in the direction of a potentially different political 
culture to that of either statism or piecemeal social engineering. The 
authors call this alternative approach participatory democracy. 
The first step in this direction was taken in drawing up the programme. 
The RDP grew out of the forces struggling to transform South Africa 
and the demands of ordinary members of the ANC, its allies in the trade 
unions, civics and other social movements, as well as many policy 
researchers linked to the ANC Alliance. 
It has been openly debated at many conferences both inside the ANC 
and among its allies. The sixth draft of the RDP was made public, and 
a range of players outside the Alliance have been consulted and invited 
to comment on it. This open approach to policy formulation is unique 
in our country's history. 
However, the real test of the innovativeness of the RDP will lie in its 
implementation. Democracy, the RDP argues: 
"...is not confined to periodic elections. It is rather an active process » 
enabling everyone to contribute to reconstruction and developmerit." 
(ANC 1994: 7) 
To democratise and make the new Government efficient is a daunting 
task. Especially as the new Government will be crucially dependent - at 
least in the short to medium term - on civil servants trained under the 
apartheid state. 
But the intention of the authors of the RDP is quite clearly not to rely 
on the state alone to deliver the new South Africa. The state will support 
and coordinate the formulation and implementation of social policy. The 
RDP envisages a partnership between the key stakeholders. It states: 
'The democratic order we envisage must foster a wide range of 
institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil 
society on the basis of informed and empowered citizens." (ANC 
1994: 120). 
That is the difference between the process of transition in South Africa 
and in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Apartheid did not die because 
of a change of heart among rulers. It was largely a response to organised 
pressures from below. 
The anti-apartheid struggle created powerful social movements and 
community based organisations that the RDP conceives of as a 'major 
asset in the effort to democratise and develop our society' (ANC 1994: 
121). 
The estimated 230 forums that grew up as legitimate transitional 
institutions in the early 1990s are mentioned by the RDP as potential 
partners. These forums are arguably unique among countries undergoing 
transition from authoritarianism. But their precise role is not spelled 
out in the RDP. 
The RDP also envisages an important role for the country's estimated 
15 000 non-profit, non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Their economic 
clout alone makes NGOs important actors in African states. As one analyst 
noted: 
"Northern NGOs now collectively transfer to the South more than 
the World Bank group does." (Sandberg 1993: 8) 
In developing this participatory path to policy, the ANC and its allies 
are going to have to walk a tightrope. They face the danger of being 
held to ransom by social movements when they fail to deliver according 
to expectations. Business Day alluded to this when it warned of the 
danger of the South African National Civics Organisation (Sanco) installing 
itself as the: 
"...gatekeeper through which all applications must be made, all 
decisions must be made, all decisions transmitted and all funding 
allocated." (The Enforcer, March 11, 1994) 
But to conceive of these organisations as obstacles on the road to democracy 
is to misunderstand their role in deepening democracy. Instead of trying 
to marginalise them, the RDP calls for attention to be given to: 
"...enhancing the capacity of such formations to adapt to partially 
changed roles." (ANC 1994: 121) 
The most difficult challenge facing anti-apartheid organisations is to shift 
from a political culture of resistance to one of reconstruction, while 
retaining their hard won independence. 
Organisations such as Sanco and Cosatu cannot undertake this task 
on their own. But whether they meet the challenge will depend on the 
extent to which government performance manages to adequately address 
workers' expectations. 
Workers' expectations, the Alliance and democracy 
Most respondents had never heard of the RDP nor participated in its 
formulation. Against this, some 44% saw the RDP as able to provide 
improvements in their working and living conditions. Due to lack of 
involvement, however, 50% of respondents were uncertain as to whether 
it would do so. 
Nevertheless, when confronted with specific demands, between 72% and 
90% of workers thought the new Government would improve their lives 
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over the next five years by providing better housing and public transport, 
higher wages, access to land, clean water, electricity, telephones, education 
and training, nutritional food and a safe and healthy working environment 
(Figure 19). 
Does this indicate unrealistically high expectations? Firstly, the way in 
which the question was posed invited workers to respond in the affirmative. 
Secondly, their commitment to the Tripartite Alliance and thereby to the 
RDP was consistent with the understanding that the new Government 
will be able to meet some of their needs within the next five years -
especially if they view the RDP as a policy they have mandated the 
Government to carry out. 
Despite workers' lack of information and participation in formulating 
policies, there appeared to be a high level of trust in the leaders of the 
Tripartite Alliance. This was consistent with support for having worker 
leaders in Parliament to represent their interests - 80% - and for Parliament 
as the best vehicle for representing workers* interests - 80% - noted in 
Chapter 4. 
In this context, legitimising the state's role in reconstruction will clearly 
require a new relationship between civil society and institutions of class 
power. The RDP is likely to give rise to an increasing number of joint 
policy making forums, but with the danger of increasing state control 
over civil society. 
Where working class demands for social change outstrip the ability of 
the capitalist class to deliver, as is potentially the case in South Africa, 
the enlargement of the public sector through nationalisation and stale 
planning might re-emerge as a popular demand. But such policies would 
receive little support from international capital and international lending 
institutions. 
However, the reluctance of the Government to consider part or even full 
ownership over the commanding heights of the economy might mean 
that the most productive and technologically advanced sectors remain 
largely beyond the state's control and hamper its ability to restructure 
society and the economy. 
Social and welfare services spelled out in the RDP might fall short of 
projected targets due to insufficient administrative control over private 
enterprises, the imposition of strict monetary policies, the structural crisis 
of the South African economy, intransigence on the part of civil servants 
or any number of associated constraints. 
The RDP could then foreseeably generate contradictions that would lead 
to its undoing. Some believe that the publication of the RDP draft White 
Paper in September 1994 'represented a very significant compromise to 
the neo-liberal, trickle down economic policy preferences of the old regime' 
(Adelzadeh and Padayachee 1994). They argue that the RDP White Paper-
is: 
"...an essentially neo-liberal RDP strategy which...may well generate 
some level of economic growth; should this happen, the existing 
mainly white and Indian bourgeois will be consolidated and 
strengthened; the black bourgeoisie will grow rapidly; a black middle 
class and some members of the black urban working class will 
become incorporated into the magic circle of insiders; but for the 
remaining 60% to 70% of our society this growth path, we venture 
to predict, will deliver little or nothing for many years to come." 
(Adelzadeh and Padayachee 1994: 16) 
This leads to consideration of whether the Tripartite Alliance could succeed 
in binding Cosatu members to consensus politics and restricting their 
struggles to the parameters of collective bargaining. Narrowing Cosatu 
to collective bargaining could well consolidate the divisions between the 
'insiders' and 'outsiders'. 
Despite the high levels of trust in the Alliance and in Parliament, if the 
ANC Government fails to deliver on most of the benefits spelled out in 
the RDP, very few respondents in our survey would remain passive. 
This must be seen in relation to the finding that only about 2% of 
respondents believed it would be possible for the new Government to 
make policies without consulting their supporters. It was also in line 
with the majority response that workers would always need unions to 
represent their interests, and with the culture of militancy and direct 
democracy in the labour movement. \ 
/ 
In short, our respondents indicated that if their expectations were not 
met they would readily engage in direct, extra-parliamentary action: 72% 
of workers supported the option of ongoing mass action to force the 
Government to deliver on its promises; 66% supported the idea of putting 
pressure on former unionists sent to Parliament; and the same number 
supported engaging in collective action through unions (Figure 201. 
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All three of these options involve extra-parliamentary activity without 
necessarily breaking support for the Tripartite Alliance. This is reinforced 
by support shown for the continuation of the Alliance - 76% (Figure 21). 
However, there was a significant minority throughout expressing the view 
that worker interests might best be served outside the ANC Alliance, 
through an independent workers' party or through Cosatu's non-alignment 
with any party. Forty percent said they would vote for another party in 
the next election, and 29% said they would support the formation of an 
alternative workers' party. 
It can be postulated that if dissatisfaction with the ability of the Alliance 
to meet expectations grows, this minority would grow. However, it is 
clear that the SACP is not seen by workers as being able to play this 
role, and does not have - for the moment at least - a separate identity 
as the political representative of the working class. 
All this suggests that containing industrial conflict within the bounds 
of what a multi-class alliance will tolerate will become increasingly difficult, 
even when it is legitimised in terms of the national interest. 
Yet the success of such an endeavour might well turn on the extent to 
which leaders in the labour movement would be able and willing to act 
in ways which run contrary to the interests of members. 
This is likely to lead to conflict as our survey clearly reveals a deep 
belief among Cosatu members in the principles of rank and file democracy 
and their willingness to engage in struggle if their needs are not met. 
These conflicts are likely to be exacerbated by greater involvement of 
specialists as the process of transforming apartheid capitalism becomes 
increasingly complex. Furthermore, an aspiring African bourgeoisie and 
a growing class of civil servants will conceivably attempt to construct a 
vision of transformation that leaves their class privileges intact. 
Such a scenario would alienate mass based organs of civil society ev€!n 
further from the policy making process. This has not escaped the attention 
of the left wing in the labour movement: 
"Wage restraint + strict monetary policies + eternal cooperative 
partnership between capital and labour + achieve higher levels of 
profitability + government expenditure within existing constraints 
= the workers will pay." (Etkind and Harvey: 1993 86). 
As long as the primary responsibility for production and distribution 
remains with the owners of capital, the state will risk an economic crisis 
if it fails to implement policies acceptable to capital. 
Moreover, the extent to which any potential threat to the dominance of 
the capitalist class can be transformed into an actual challenge is limited 
by the larger capitalist context - and corresponding class relations - in 
which the new Government has to operate. As Przeworski (1991: 34) 
correctly notes: 
"Even a procedurally perfect democracy may remain an oligarchy: 
the rule of the rich over the poor." 
A pluralist, representative democracy consists of complex rules, procedures 
and institutions which by their very nature obscure the extra-parliamentary 
power of capital, civil service and the military, and are generally inimical 
to rapid and fundamental change, 
Powerful interests are cloaked by the ideology of parliamentary 'sovereignty' 
and compromise politics. Indeed, while a government-trade union alliance 
could in a sense conduct class struggle through the state, this may itself 
undermine the viability and 'relative autonomy' of the state. Held argues 
(1987: 120): 
"If state intervention undermines the process of capital 
accumulation, it simultaneously undermines the material basis 
of the state...(That is) constraints exist in liberal democracies -
constraints imposed by the requirements of private capital 
accumulation - which systematically limit policy options." 
What is being argued, in other words, is that the transition to parliamentary 
democracy in South Africa should not be allowed to obscure the crucial 
centres of power that remain beyond the organisational and hegemonic 
control of the new Government. 
A commitment to parliamentarianism may obstruct the ability to penetrate 
the institutional framework of society and expose the real power relations 
underlying these institutional forms. 
Transitions to representative democracy in Latin America, write Harding 
and Petras (1988: 11), reveal that newly elected popular governments 
have often propagated: 
"...the doctrine that regressive socio-economic policies that benefit 
the foreign and domestic elite are a necessary trade-off for 
'democracy'... 
"A false dichotomy is put forth between authoritarian and 
democratic regimes, obscuring the active role that the authoritarians 
played as negotiators and facilitators of the transition, and, more 
important, the power they continue to exercise over the instruments 
of violence." 
An accompanying theme is attempts by the left to avoid mass mobilisation 
against the elected government because of the danger of provoking a 
return to dictatorship. 
The Brazilian communist parties, for example, argued that in order to 
sustain the space created by parliamentary democracy, mass strikes, 
mass action, seizure of land and other .forms of militant struggle should 
be discarded in favour of electoral pacts and broad alliances with the 
centre. 
In practice this means that the space for counter hegemonic struggles 
created by parliamentary democracy is not utilised and civil society is 
brought more firmly under the influence of capitalists ideology. 
Cosat i i , the R D P and social transformation 
The struggles of committed and courageous anti-apartheid activists led 
to the decline of the apartheid state. If we are to avoid statism in 
post-apartheid South Africa, we need to take seriously the RDP's aim of 
democratising society as well as the state. 
This will require giving all the organisations of civil society - trade unions, 
civics, women's organisations, youth and student organisations, churches 
and universities - a wider role in policy formulation and implementation. 
Extra resources and an expanded role will help civil organisations 
transform from being resistance movements to accepting co-responsfbility 
for the country's reconstruction. 
Strengthening the organs of civil society is the best way to avert the 
dangers of holistic blueprints that Popper warned against. It is also the 
best way of ensuring that the RDP is implemented in a democratic way 
through consultation with all South Africans. 
In the next chapter we explore further the possibilities and limitations 
of achieving transformation within the confines of representative 
democracy and a capitalist state. 
LABOUR AND THE TRANSITION / 
In this chapter we debate the argument, proffered by transition theory, 
that any transition from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy necessarily 
involves compromises on economic democracy or egalitarianism. 
The implications of this debate for the role of the labour movement in 
South African reconstruction are discussed, with particular reference to 
the possibility of some of form of co-determination or social contract 
providing the basis for a transition to socialism - a goal Cosatu has 
always espoused. 
The limits to transformation / 
Our point of departure was from the body of work which in recent years 
sought to analyse the transition in South Africa within the framework 
set out by theorists of transition from authoritarian rule in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. 
Beyond simply describing the process of transition, the concern of certain 
political scientists is to understand the circumstances in which 
democratisation processes are 'successful'. Their assumptions include a 
particular understanding of democracy: one which is limited to 'political 
democracy' which consists of 'certain sets of rules and procedures, 
principally open elections and oppositional rights' (MacEwan 1988: 117). 
While this is debatable at a theoretical level, what is significant is their 
conclusion that where such democratisation is successful, it is normally 
at the expense of socio-economic transformation: democratisation is, 
weighed against 'socialisation' or 'social equalisation'. >' 
They conclude that where political liberalisation and democratisation is 
'consolidated', it precludes socio-economic transformation and usually 
involves a 'pact' or social contract in which, it is implied, the interests 
of the working class are necessarily compromised (Przeworski 1986, 1991; 
O'Donnell et al 1986). 
Indeed, most transition theorists either assume or conclude that democracy 
- in its limited definition - and capitalist economic relations go hand in 
hand. Democracy correlates with wealth, and wealth can only be created 
by capitalism. 
Thus market economics, private property, profit and capital accumulation 
are seen either as essential to democracy - as in Barrington-Moore's 
1966 'no bourgeois, no democracy' - or as a 'necessary but not sufficient 
condition' for democracy, as Huntington argues (quoted in Allison 1994: 
9-10). 
Transition theory thus rests on a particularly narrow definition of 
democracy. Once democracy is limited purely to the political level, a 
transition is deemed complete when formal electoral and constitutional 
requirements are fulfilled. Moreover, any attempts to expand democracy 
beyond these limits are seen as a potential threat to the stability or 
consolidation of the democratic regime. 
A second, related conclusion of transition theorists is that while the 
emergence of grassroots democratic structures in civil society is appropriate 
to a particular phase in the transition process -- that of ahertura or 
liberalisation - they cannot last beyond that phase if the pacted transition 
is to be successfully completed. 
The pact essentially involves the working class - or other independent 
organs of civil society - being relegated to their 'proper place', which is 
within the boundaries of what is negotiated as being necessary for stability 
and economic growth within the framework of the market. 
When political democratisation has been achieved, the masses are 
necessarily demobilised and participate in politics in the 'correct' way, 
which is by voting every few years for the legislature. But behind this 
conclusion is the notion that civil society has no fundamental effect on 
the transition process: that it is a process driven by elites who form the 
pacts and have access to the 'formal levers of political change'. 
The problem with this analysis is not only the limited conception <>l' 
democracy upon which it rests, but also its emphasis on process rather 
than content: an emphasis which assumes that class interests have little 
if any role to play in deciding outcomes. 
To be fair, some transition theorists do concede that civil society may 
change outcomes. They argue, for instance, that a 'highly mobilised popular 
upsurge' may at one stage bring down a dictatorship, but at another 
make 'subsequent democratic consolidation difficult' and even impossible 
- in other words, it may result in a counter coup and an even more 
authoritarian regime (O'Donnell et al 1986: 65). 
The message here is not that civil society is unimportant, but that it 
must be careful not to endanger the democratisation process with its 
militancy. It is also argued that 'interim pacts' which assist in the 
consolidation of democracy in the short term may 'subsequently impede 
democratic consolidation if their restrictive rules and guarantees produce 
substantive disenchantment and procedural deadlock' (Ibid: 66). 
Their conclusion from the above observation, therefore, is not to give 
more of a role to civil society in the transition process, but simply to 
state that transition is characterised by a 'high degree of uncertainty 
and indeterminacy' (Ibid). 
It can be argued on the basis of our survey that, unlike in the above 
scenario where working class interests can be - and preferably are -
'pacted away' and 'normalised', the strength of civil society in South 
Africa will retain some of its influence in the political realm. 
What then is the political role of the labour movement, as the strongest 
and most independent organ of civil society, in South Africa? If the 
'pacted transition' consolidates successfully, will the Tripartite Alliance 
survive? Will the allegiance of workers to the Alliance prove stronger 
than their immediate class interest? 
Other sectors of civil society, such as the South African National Civics 
Organisation, are already indicating the pattern of demobilisation predicted 
by transition theorists. But the labour movement may prove different. 
Previous chapters have shown the fierce independence of the union 
movement and its commitment to a more radical and thorough form of 
democracy, not to mention its determination to use its considerable powers 
in the extra-parliamentary arena if the Government is not sufficiently 
sensitive to its material interests. / 
If we accept, for the moment, that democratisation in South Africa is 
taking place within the limits imposed by a capitalist social formation -
in other words, if we accept a limited definition of democracy - what do 
transition theorists tell us about the success of such a class compromise 
in newly democratic societies? 
A representative answer is given by Sheahan (1986: 157), who argues 
that there is tension inherent in the economic policies which must be 
followed in societies if they are to remain political democracies: they 
entail restraints and the limitation of claims, while at the same time 
they have to meet some expectations. 
Key to economic policies is increasing employment while limiting wage 
demands. Yet he admits that 'social agreements on wage norms have 
been tried in Latin America and have consistently failed to work for any 
length of time'. 
Nevertheless, Sheahan (1986: 154) does offer the hope that, in some 
cases, authoritarian systems will have done so much damage that domestic 
social groups might, at least initially, be more willing than historically 
they might otherwise have been to accept the compromises and restraints 
necessary to restore functioning democracies. 
Given the findings of our survey, willingness to compromise in the hope 
that the new political democracy will be better than the former racial 
authoritarianism in its economic management is probably an accurate 
reflection of the labour movement's current position in South Africa. But 
what if policy tensions begin to affect the working class negatively? 
Sheahan is optimistic that the possibility exists for economic growth in 
the capitalist system which benefits all sectors of society sufficiently to 
hold the democratic consensus together. He refers to this as 'shared 
growth'. But political democracy is no guarantee that such economic 
policies will be followed - and such economic policies by no means assure 
the stabilisation of political democracy. 
Indeed, Sheahan is extremely tentative in his optimism: the best he can 
offer is that the 'special circumstances of escape from the drastic political 
repression of the past might...help to create a more durable consensus 
on the need for shared growth, as opposed to the antagonistic strategies 
which did so much to create explosive conditions in the past' (Ibid: 157). 
Przeworski (1986: 63) is even more dispiriting about the prospects of 
economic growth occurring within stabilised political democracies. He 
argues that class compromise is necessary for the establishment and 
maintenance of capitalist democracies. This compromise entails that 
'profits cannot fall so low as to threaten reproduction of capital, and 
wages cannot fall so low as to make profits appear as a particularist 
interest of capital'. 
Such a compromise may find expression in a social pact that involves 
the labour movement agreeing to wage restraints in return for expanded 
employment opportunities and welfare measures. Yet such pacts are 
unlikely to succeed for any or all of three main reasons. 
Firstly, such pacts are by definition narrow and the interests of organised 
labour may be played off against those of the 'masses'. Secondly, public 
sector workers have no vested interest in such a pact, and may in fact 
be threatened by it, which narrows it further. Lastly, both employers and 
governments are ambivalent towards strong trade unions, and it is only 
strong unions which will participate in such pacts (Przeworski 1991: 185). 
What normally happens, therefore, is that governments begin to vacillate 
when faced with competing pressures from different sections of their 
support base and become increasingly authoritarian rather than more 
responsive to representative institutions, whether they are parliamentary 
institutions or organs of civil society such as trade unions (Ibid: 186-7). 
Przeworski (1986: 63) goes on to argue that, in order to hold together 
a compromise, 'the typical democratising coalition is likely to adopt a 
Keynesian economic project'. As we are clearly seeing in South Africa, 
such a project involves a 'combination of private property, redistribution 
of income and a strong state'. But those kinds of policies, and the 
compromise on which they are based, are inherently fragile and usually 
of short duration. 
Whether Keynesian policies result in wage increases being eroded by 
inflation and unemployment, as Przeworski argues, or whether wage 
restraints are imposed on the working class by the social contract, the 
likelihood is that the organisations which represent the working class 
politically - in our case the ANC and SACP - are in danger of losing 
their popular support. 
Przeworski suggests, in effect, that such populist policies are better for 
building temporary coalitions - like the Tripartite Alliance - than at building 
stable democracies. He is thus forced to conclude that it seems as if 'an 
almost complete docility and patience on the part of organised .workers 
is needed for a democratic transformation to succeed' (Ibid). 
"We cannot avoid the possibility that a transition to democracy 
can be made only at the cost of leaving economic relations intact, 
not only the structure of production but even distribution of income." 
(Przeworski 1986) 
In other words, we are back at the conclusion that the choice is essentially 
between political democracy and economic equalisation. It is simply not 
possible for the poor and oppressed to have their cake and eat it. However, 
according to our survey, this is precisely what South African workers 
are determined to do. 
It is useful at this point to make a distinction between theories of 
democratisation and theories of democracy. As Allison (1994: 8, 14) points 
out, theorists of democracy have recently tended towards what he calls 
an 'emancipationist' conception of democracy which is critical of limiting 
democracy to institutions such as regular elections. 
On the other hand, the democratisation referred to by transition theorists 
entails what he calls a minimalist definition of democracy. For transition 
theorists of democratisation, as distinct from democracy, the 1980s were 
a triumph. For emancipationists, however, the same decade saw an increase 
in social and economic inequality combined with a decrease in political 
participation. 
This is neatly illustrated by the 'well established paradox that the conditions 
for successful capitalism seem to provide the best possibilities for the 
maintenance of a stable electoral system, but to limit massively the range 
of choices which people can make under that system'. 
Allison's conclusion - which is similar to that of transition theorists - is 
that if it is accepted that there is no 'true hybrid' between capitalist and 
command economic systems, the best that can be hoped for is that 
authoritarian states first foster capitalist social relations, and then allow 
for gradual democratisation at a later stage (Ibid: 23). 
Those who accept a more radical, or emancipationist definition of 
democracy - akin to what Held would term 'participatory' - would argue 
that a truly democratic transition necessarily entails a fundamental 
restructuring of economic relations. These two approaches to democracy 
are reflected inside Cosatu. 
J Co-determination and working class power 
Cosatu's post-election congress came together under the banner of 
'Reconstruction for Working Class Power' - confirming the intention of 
the labour movement to play a central role in reconstruction. The extent 
to which this will be realised depends largely on the institutional framework 
through which co-determination of the reconstruction process is to be 
carried out. 
The survey indicates support for two possible approaches to the role of 
the labour movement in reconstruction. Both share a vision of socialism 
as the product of popular mobilisation and struggles. 
Firstly, there is an approach which suggests that a struggle on class 
lines within the ANC will push it in a socialist direction by encouraging 
radical or structural reform. The class content of representative democracy 
is downplayed in favour of an emphasis on its form. 
The central idea is securing certain centres of power to allow the popular 
classes to subordinate the capitalist class to the logic of social needs. 
Mass based organisations in civil society are seen as a basis for pressing 
capital into realising a productive and expansive economy by limiting its 
prerogatives. The dilemma is how to combine militant mass action and 
the consensus politics that co-determination will demand. 
The second approach believes the central task is to intensify the class 
struggle and give a socialist impetus to the discontent that is likely to 
arise with lack of fundamental change in post-apartheid South Africa. 
While the proponents of this perspective accept that an immediate 
revolutionary transformation of South Africa is not on the cards, they 
insist that the foundation for a transition to socialism will not come 
from compromise and joint control but rather from increasing struggle 
by the popular masses. The formation of an independent workers' party 
is usually seen as an indispensable part of this struggle. 
The 81% of our respondents who indicated their support for the Tripartite 
Alliance, and the 75% who indicated that they would continue to support 
the Alliance in the next election, indicate that a workers' party is unlikely 
to gain widespread worker support. 
However, if needs are not met, living conditions deteriorate or the state 
becomes authoritarian, there could be backing for an ANC led radical 
project or, failing that, for an independent workers' party of the left. 
But a militant workers' party would be no less subject to pressures to 
demobilise than other sectors of civil society. For example, the Brazilian 
Workers Party (PT: Partido dos Trabalhadores) has been criticised on 
precisely those grounds. 
The PT, established in 1980 as an independent socialist oriented party 
with its origins in the trade union movement and strong grassroots 
community support, contested and lost the 1990 and 1994 presidential 
elections in Brazil. It has been argued that the PT, through its involvement 
in parliamentary politics, has gradually distanced itself from its radical 
grassroots politics of the past: 
'The PT...has separated itself from the trade union movement and 
lost many of the characteristics of a mass party (for example: 
organised and active grassroots nuclei, party activity permanently 
linked to social movements, formalised internal democracy, an 
internal struggle centred on the comparison of programmes, and 
regular party congresses). 
'Today it is closer to the model of a figurehead party: devoid of 
grassroots organisation, with only seasonal party activity, linked 
to elections." (Boito 1994: 15) 
The prospect, therefore, is that even popular structures are destined to 
become increasingly isolated and disempowered. Alliance politics may 
amount to little more than a 'deracialisation' conceived by experts, enforced 
by the state and situated in the logic of the market: 
"A Left bending over backwards to avoid chaos; a Left propitiating 
the powers that be; a Left that is nothing if not 'prudent': such...is 
the shrunken vision of transition to democracy that the realism 
of the epoch...would seek to fashion for us." (Saul 1994: 11). 
Thus while the first approach appears to underestimate the real limitations 
of tripartite policy formulation and operates on an unduly narrow definition 
of democracy, the second approach overemphasises the corrupting or 
anti-democratic potential of tripartitism and overlooks the Alliance's real 
potential for stimulating radical change. 
If Przeworski (1991) is correct, the new Government will seek to bolster 
the reformism of the first approach (the left centre of the Alliance) at 
the expense of the more revolutionary approach (the left wing). But the 
survey results raise questions about the ability of the state and capital 
to subordinate the interests of Cosatu members in this manner. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely the strength of a parliamentary democracy 
to present the state as a neutral institution which can be occupied and 
steered in the direction dictated by the policies of the majority party. 
While class conflict can never be wholly contained within the parameters 
of the institutions of parliamentary democracy, liberal democracies provide 
the opportunity to channel industrial conflict into 'legitimate' institutions 
and to impose austerity measures to limit working class demands. 
An emphasis on state intervention to make the system more efficient, 
and a commitment to gradual reform, may therefore serve to maintain 
the Alliance in office while denying it real power. 
The survey clearly reveals that most respondents are prepared to engage 
in collective action to ensure that the Government makes good on its 
promises. The real dilemma thus arises when a balance between short 
term goals and long term transformation has to be established. 
How are the setbacks of short to medium term objectives - consensus 
politics, compromise, increasing incorporation etc - going to be overcome 
in order to sustain the long term aim of transformation? 
Before exploring that issue in the final chapter, it is necessary to explore 
the impact of the April 1994 elections on Cosatu. 
COSATU AND THE ELECTIONS 
This chapter analyses the nature and extent of Cosatu's involvement in 
the ANC's election campaign, and its impact on the federation's 
organisational structures and resources. It is based on interviews with 
union officials and gives voice to their views. The chapter concludes by 
looking at the challenges and issues facing the country's biggest and 
most influential union federation in the post-election period and beyond. 
Debates in Cosatu on the relationship between it and the ANC did not 
start with the election campaign. In the 1980s one of the major debates 
in unions was the relationship between unions and politics. At Cosatu's 
1987 National Congress an uneasy consensus was reached by the major 
tendencies in the federation when they adopted the Freedom Charter 
and acknowledged that unions had a role in politics. 
The importance of this accommodation among the tendencies was twofold. 
Firstly, it laid the basis for what was to become the Tripartite Alliance. 
Secondly, it formed what was to become a consensus position when 
Cosatu's structures were debating whether or not to support the ANC 
in the elections. 
Thus when the time arrived for Cosatu to take a decision, the key question 
was not whether or not to back the ANC but how to do it in a way that 
benefited Cosatu and its members. For this reason Cosatu's involvement 
in the election campaign was not just a matter of backing the ANC: it 
was a series of different but related interventions. 
Cosatu's interventions 
There were three separate but related interventions by Cosatu in "the 
1994 elections: the RDP, union candidates on ANC lists, and' voter 
education and canvassing for an ANC victory. 
• The RDP 
The RDP was the brainchild of Cosatu. It was initially conceived of as 
a pact to be signed between the ANC and Cosatu with the ohientivp
binding the ANC to specific agreements in return for which the federation 
would undertake to deliver votes for the ANC. However, as discussion 
deepened it was felt that such a programme should go beyond just the 
ANC and Cosatu and be a unifying plan also including civil society and 
other parties and organisations. 
The RDP formed the basis of the ANC's election manifesto arid has been 
used to engage many other forces, including business, in debates about 
the economy and the future. 
As an intervention the RDP enabled Cosatu to gain maximum benefit 
from the Alliance, so that it did not end with delivering votes for the 
ANC. It has also allowed Cosatu to hold the new Government to the 
plan, and provided a yardstick by which to measure its performance. 
• Candidates on ANC lists 
After the announcement of the first 20 union candidates in September 
1993, many more Cosatu leaders were nominated to stand as ANC 
candidates for regional parliaments. 
Since the election, many more unionists have been nominated to serve 
on interim local government structures. With local government elections 
due in late 1995, the number of unionists in local government is likely 
to increase even further. 
As early as May 1992 Cosatu was already considering the party candidates 
option. Cosatu's national negotiations coordinator, Jayendra Naidoo, 
explained at the time: 
"Cosatu will not contest the elections. However, the Central 
Executive Committee has discussed releasing people from the 
leadership of Cosatu to be available to stand for election to the 
Constituent Assembly on an ANC platform if we are approached 
by them." (South African Labour Bulletin, May 16, 1992) 
Having union leaders in government offered a number of opportunities 
to Cosatu and the labour movement. Firstly, people trusted by workers 
would occupy key policy making institutions at all levels of government. 
Secondly, for the first time workers would have access to sympathetic 
decision makers, many of whom ought to feel obliged to keep unions 
informed about discussions in decision making structures. Finally, union 
nominees would understand the concerns and aspirations of workers. 
Union nominees come from a tradition which respects principles of 
accountability, particularly mandates and report backs. Prominent union 
candidate and former Cosatu general secretary, Jay Naidoo, indicated 
publicly that he would seriously consider resigning his seat if the new 
Government became unaccountable or deliberately failed to honour the 
RDP and worker rights. 
• Voter education and canvassing 
The decision to do voter education and canvass voters for an ANC victory 
flowed from the other elements of Cosatu's intervention. It offered a 
number of opportunities to Cosatu. 
Union leaders were able to re-establish contact with members through 
factory general meetings, workers' forums and other meetings. This was 
important, particularly in view of the fact that leaders had publicly 
acknowledged a gap between leadership and rank and file members. 
McVicar Dyasopu, CWIU official in Port Elizabeth, admitted that in 1993 
the union structures were 'seriously collapsing'. After the union and 
Cosatu embarked on the election campaign, he said, there was a noticeable 
improvement in attendance at union meetings, particularly in shop 
stewards' attendance of locals. 
In Durban former Cosatu regional chairman Samuel Mthethwa, now a 
member of the regional assembly, pointed to the establishment of a new 
Cosatu local in Tongaat as one of the gains the federation made out of 
the campaign. Clearly involvement in the campaign offered Cosatu an 
opportunity to recruit new members, mobilise old members and revitalise 
its structures. 
It is important to make certain general observations regarding Cosatu 
and the elections. By participating in the election campaign Cosatu was 
able to bring its solid track record of struggle to bear as a key determinant 
of the election outcome. 
The federation was visible throughout the transition - for example with 
its anti-VAT strike in 1991 and Chris Hani stayaways in 1993 - and 
was instrumental in using mass action to unlock the transition process 
when it seemed to stall, for example with rolling mass action in 1992. 
Of all the parties contesting the election the ANC was the only one to 
be supported by a strong, mass based organisation like Cosatu. This 
not only influenced the election result but also made it very difficult for 
the ANC to sideline the federation after the elections. The ANC still needs 
Cosatu's support to succeed in implementing its plans. 
Finally, it is important to note that Cosatu's decision to support the 
ANC was taken unanimously. No splits or major divisions were occasioned 
by the decision in the federation or among any of its affiliates. On the 
contrary the campaign served to cement the federation. 
'Cosatu had no choice,' said CWIU's national education officer and assistant 
election coordinator, Chris Bonner: 'It would have been very difficult to 
stand back.' 
The election's impact on Cosatu 
• Members and structures 
From the start of voter education activities in late 1993, the campaign 
enabled Cosatu and its affiliates to reach thousands of members. The 
effect was that many members were mobilised and their interest in union 
activities revived, at least temporarily. 
The Eastern Cape seemed to be the region where unions were most 
successful in mobilising members around the elections. A series of workers' 
forums were held throughout the region. Attendance was generally good. 
According to Vo lyibilika, Cosatu's regional secretary, so successful were 
the forums in the region that they began to raise the issue of solidarity. 
He gave the Sappi strike in March as a case in point. 
Tyibilika said forums were also instrumental in orchestrating mass actions 
to push employers to accept demands around voter education. 
Numsa's national organiser, Gavin Hartford, who is based in the Eastern 
Cape, agreed that the election campaign led to important improvements 
in union structures. He gave the example of Numsa's Uitenhage local, 
which had collapsed but was resuscitated as a result of workers' 
involvement in the campaign. 
Many other union leaders and officials also reported noticeable 
improvements in union structures. Some, like the South African 
Democratic Teachers Union (Sadtu) in Durban and Saccawu in Cape 
Town, also claimed to have recruited new members as a result of 
mobilisation. 
However, most unionists admitted that the process of involving workers 
and mobilising was slow. The biggest gain recorded was that of Sadtu 
in Southern Natal, which claimed to have recruited about 12 000 new 
teachers from late in 1993 to early March 1994. 
In general, two points can be made about the effect of the campaign on 
membership and structures. The one is that the mobilisation achieved 
in the campaign did not translate into large membership gains for most 
unions. Even the exceptional Sadtu achievement seemed more the result 
of the collapse of the homelands than of the election campaign. 
The second point is that the campaign did not positively impact on union 
structures in general. Cases where there have been improvements are 
few and far between. 
Even where there have been notable improvements in structures, it is 
doubtful that they can be sustained because the causes of the earlier 
collapse of structures have not been resolved. 
• Servicing members 
There is no doubt that union activities, particularly servicing members, 
were adversely affected by the election campaign. Every union released 
at least one full-time official and some shop stewards in each region, 
and even some at national level to work on elections. 
In addition some unions, like PPWAWU in the Eastern Cape, instructed 
their officials to canvass in between their normal union work. Former 
Cosatu Western Cape regional secretary and regional assembly member, 
Jonathan Arendse, acknowledged that unions had to postpone 
'non-essential union work' because of the elections. 
Post and Telecommunications Workers Association (Potwa) Eastern Cape 
regional secretary, Mxolisi Mashwabane, said his union found it difficult 
to cope with union work: 
'The Cosatu resolution said that officials must focus on the 
campaign. We have been attending and addressing workers' forums. 
Partially day to day issues have not been taken up as before. 
"For example, some hearings (of members at factories) are not 
attended, some management meetings are not attended and we 
are not being in touch as usual. It. is a problem, particularly in 
unions with few staff in big regions. It has been very difficult to 
cope." 
Gaps also appeared in shop stewards activities as a result of secondment 
to the elections. On the shop floor shop stewards attended to day to 
day grievances and cases before union officials intervened. They were 
part of unions' servicing machinery. Themba Mfeka, PPWAWU's assistant 
general secretary, explained the problem: 
"Shop stewards are influential people in union structures. So this 
secondment had a negative impact in union structures." 
Unionists seconded to the election effort with the ANC, Cosatu election 
teams, Independent Electoral Commission etc, ranged from shop stewards 
to local organisers, administrators, regional secretaries, education officers 
and even general secretaries. 
Others who occupied similar positions are now elected representatives 
in central and regional governments. Unionists saw the campaign as a 
once off event and believed it to be a worthwhile sacrifice. 
• The leadership drain 
About 60 Cosatu leaders left during the elections to become members 
of the National Assembly and provincial legislatures. While the problem 
was highlighted by the departure of scores of union leaders to government, 
the 'brain drain' has been happening for some years. 
Since the late 1980s unions have been losing full-time staff through 
resignations. In the 1990s this trend accelerated as more opportunities 
opened up in other areas. At a time when Cosatu and its unions needed 
to build the capacity to handle new and complex issues, unions continued 
losing experienced and skilled people. 
Numsa's general secretary, Enoch Godongwana, noted that a number of 
organisers and shop stewards had gone into management. The concern 
was that his union had put 'a lot of effort' into training those people. 
Officials interviewed suggested that established union leaders were leaving 
for several reasons, including: 
es- Greener pastures 
us* Greater family responsibilities 
os* Management poaching 
Loss of vision. 
Although low remuneration and poor working conditions were a major 
cause of the exodus, some unionists argued that a number of other 
factors also caused officials to leave. Gavin Hartford of Numsa argued 
that part of the problem was that there were no career paths for union 
officials. He correctly predicted that after the election the trend of people 
leaving unions would accelerate. He pointed out: 
"After the elections union officials will be in the market. There 
will be affirmative action and many people will be looking for 
clever guys with black faces." 
Chris Bonner added that: 
"Some people have been around for too long. Suddenly new 
opportunities, new avenues have appeared." 
This highlights the impact of transition in a society moving away from 
racism and minority rule. Unions were one of the few areas of employment 
which fell outside the control of the apartheid state and management, 
where people could feel proud of their work. Many of those who chose 
to work in unions did not do so because it was a career choice but 
because it was part of 'the struggle'. 
Now that there is democracy and deracialisation of society, and some 
affirmative action in management, many unionists are looking for jobs 
with career paths and salaries which will enable them to better provide 
for their families. 
It is clear that the civil service is now a legitimate structure in the eyes 
of activists. Those who have been offered key jobs in the civil service 
have rarely turned them down. Cosatu officials have entered key civil 
service jobs, and some have followed their leaders into government. 
The leadership drain is not only at the level of full-time union officials. 
There is a clear trend of shop stewards leaving union positions or leaving 
unions altogether to take up higher positions, particularly managerial 
positions in personnel and human resource departments, but also as 
supervisors and production technicians. 
Affirmative action has made the issue of shop stewards leaving unions 
even more serious. In many cases shop stewards come from the better 
educated ranks of the work force. Shop stewards are often the most 
eligible candidates for affirmative action in the workplace. 
The election 
Cosatu regional leaders were generally confident that most of their members 
voted for the ANC. This is corroborated by our survey. 
However, in the Western Cape the survey showed a significant National 
Party presence in Cosatu ranks. Elias Maboee, a Sactwu shop steward 
seconded full-time to the regional elections team, carried out voter 
education and canvassing in the region. He said many coloured workers, 
particularly in his union, said they voted for the National Party for the 
following reasons: 
us- They believed that the ANC was behind the violence in KwaZulu-Natal 
and Gauteng and that if they voted for the ANC violence would occur 
in their region. 
is" They feared affirmative action and believed Africans would take over 
their jobs. This fear was exacerbated by some employers telling workers 
that they would no longer employ coloureds because jobs would be 
open for Africans only. 
rap Many coloured workers feared that once the ANC was in power Africans 
would take away their houses. They quoted events in Delft, Tafelsig 
and Hanover Park in 1993, in which new houses built for coloured 
people were forcibly occupied by Africans. 
rap There was fear that the ANC would take away workers' pensions and 
provident funds once it was in government. At some stage the rumour 
was so serious that President Mandela had to issue a statement 
explaining that that would not happen. 
rar Many workers also feared the SACP, which they believed was using 
the ANC to take over the countiy. Their concern was that once 
communists had taken over they would ban religion. 
Another contested region was KwaZulu-Natal, where Cosatu leaders were 
confident that most of their members voted for the ANC. Paulos Ngcobo, 
Cosatu's Southern Natal regional secretary, felt the federation was pivotal 
to the ANC campaign in the province. 
'The ANC would not be able to win on its own in this region. In 
Southern Natal and the Natal Midlands it is mainly Cosatu people 
who initiate and organise, like the big march on March 25 in 
Durban. The Tripartite Alliance in Southern Natal is weak. We 
decided to take the campaign upon ourselves." 
Cosatu leaders also believed that workers took their advice to vote for 
the ANC because Cosatu was effective in defending workers and because 
the RDP provided for the protection of worker rights and interests. 
All unions carried out intensive voter education in and outside the work 
place. Thousands of shop stewards were trained as voter educators and 
hundreds of thousands of workers were reached by trainers or independent 
voter education agencies. 
However, all unions complained that they were unable to reach all workers 
because many employers were reluctant to allow shop stewards or workers 
to be trained during working time. 
Employers were even more opposed to canvassing in workplaces by Cosatu 
or ANC representatives. In many instances Cosatu representatives went 
into factories on the pretext that they were going to do voter education 
while in reality they did canvassing for the ANC. 
Interestingly, Cosatu felt it had to canvass the votes of its members even 
though its special congress decided to back the ANC. Jonathan Arendse 
explained: 
"We are aware that factories are contested terrains. That is why 
we go around and explain to our members why Cosatu supports 
the ANC. We are not forcing our members to vote for the ANC." 
/ 
Cosatu did not focus its canvassing only on its own members. Canvassers 
also targeted non-union members and people in communities where they 
lived. Cosatu's participation in door to door canvassing was particularly 
interesting, especially in the Western Cape. In that province the federation 
transformed its locals - industrial locals and the joint shop stewards 
local - into canvassing machines. Shop stewards met for about 45 minutes 
to get briefings and were then transported to communities identified by 
the ANC for door to door blitzes. 
Elias Maboee said the exercise successfully exposed people to the views 
of Cosatu and the ANC. He reported that out of every 80 houses visited, 
Cosatu canvassers were turned away at only about four. Arendse said 
the National Party was the ANC's strongest rival in the region and there-
fore 'our strongest weapon is personal contact'. 
In the Western Cape, Cosatu canvassing augmented that of the ANC. 
Jesse Maluleka, Cosatu's national elections coordinator, believed it was 
very important for the federation: 
"We were saying to our members that participation in the door to 
door blitzes should not simply be as individual workers who join 
the ANC as volunteers, but as part of organised groups from Cosatu." 
Factory general meetings were used as a platform for canvassing, as 
well as workers' forums where speakers explained the reasons for 
supporting the ANC and were questioned by workers. 
Hundreds of forums were held throughout the country. Their format 
differed between regions. The forums started in Gauteng, where high 
profile candidates like Nelson Mandela and Jay Naidoo addressed 
thousands of shop stewards and workers at a time. 
The questions that workers put to speakers at workers' forums showed 
clearly how most workers would judge the performance of the ANC after 
the election. They ranged from jobs, affirmative action, housing, training 
and wages to the use of police in strikes. 
Accountability of union candidates 
It is important to reflect on how leaders who remain in Cosatu see the 
issue of the accountability of parliamentary candidates. When nominating 
Cosatu leaders to ANC lists was first mooted in 1992, Jayendra Naidoo 
explained that the federation envisaged a situation where unionists would 
become ANC candidates 'but they'll have a sort of ambiguous dual 
accountability'. 
However, it seems the debate was never taken beyond that point. Interviews 
with regional leaders revealed that no mechanism for collective or individual 
accountability by candidates had been worked out by the federation. 
Each Cosatu leader and each candidate expressed individual opinions 
rather than agreed policy on the matter. 
No ideas have emerged on the form of the relationship between labour 
parliamentarians and the federation. 
The future 
From the above discussion a number of conclusions can be made, many 
of which have a bearing on the future. 
The first is that while Cosatu made some organisational and political 
gains out of its involvement in the election campaign, it emerged weaker 
after the elections. Whatever gains it made were heavily outweighed by 
three main factors: internal organisational problems, loss of key leaders 
and difficulty adapting to the challenges of democracy. Lack of leadership 
and capacity could limit the federation's ability to consolidate its base 
and prepare for the challenges of the future. 
Secondly, Cosatu will be called on to make sacrifices - particularly with 
regard to wages and mass action - to ensure that resources are used 
in ways which benefit underprivileged sectors. The call by ANC leaders 
to striking public sector workers to end mass action, however valid the 
reasons, could become a precedent for similar calls in the future. 
The views of regional leaders are divided on the issue. But most leaders 
tended towards a position which accepted making sacrifices provided 
there was transparency in the way government decisions were taken and 
implemented. Shaun Pather, a Sadtu member in Durban, explained the 
conditions under which calls for sacrifices would be heeded: 
"Last year the Government's offer of a 5% increase to civil servants 
was not accepted by our members because there is a lot of 
mismanagement and corruption under the present (now former) 
Government. t 
"But in future 5% may be accepted if the rest of the money goes 
towards the RDP, for example building more classrooms. Sadtu 
leaders will be able to convince members to make sacrifices as 
long as the sacrifices are reasonable and government is 
transparent." 
Thirdly, the relationship with the new ANC Government is likely to be 
cooperative but tense. Many leaders of Cosatu expressed the view that 
an ANC government would be more sympathetic to the needs and interests 
of workers. 
Without a clear mechanism of accountability the position of labour 
parliamentarians may become veiy difficult if tension between unions 
and the Government brings them into head-on confrontation with their 
constituency. 
The relationship could get more complicated by Cosatu officials entering 
the civil service: they would automatically become the employers of Cosatu 
members in the public sector. 
While it was difficult to predict accurately relationships after the election, 
many Cosatu shop stewards and officials believed that if the Government 
failed to deliver - especially on worker rights and the RDP - it would be 
their right as an independent organisation to resort to mass action. 
Many repeated verbatim President Mandela's closing remark when he 
opened Cosatu's special congress in September last year: 
"If an ANC Government fails to deliver, you must do to it exactly 
what you did to the government of De Klerk." 
Fourthly, there was a sharp division of views on what should happen 
to the Alliance after the election. It appeared that once the election was 
over leaders would begin to take stock of their organisational capacities, 
and the argument for scaling down the Alliance into a relationship based 
on concrete issues would win the day. If that scenario materialises, the 
RDP and worker rights could become central issues in the relationship. 
Fifthly, there was no doubt among union leaders that democratisation 
of the state would have a tremendous influence on industrial relations. 
There are signs that employers are aware of this. 
Faced with global competition and pressure from the new Government 
to introduce meaningful changes, some employers have started 
experimenting with approaches towards less confrontational and more 
cooperative relationships with employees. 
Examples are the introduction of worker participation, affirmative action 
and training programmes on the shop floor by a number of companies. 
Cosatu and its affiliates have been poorly prepared for this. According 
to Chris Bonner: 
"Cosatu is facing a crisis because it is not dealing with major 
happenings on the shop floor. Organisers are not coping with new 
shop floor issues, they just run away from them." 
Of course cooperation will not do away with conflict. But what could 
happen is that lack of capacity and strategic thinking could make the 
use of conflict an attractive option for some because it has worked for 
them in the past. 
Finally, prospects for trade union unity continued to improve after the 
election. There are a number of factors propelling the three main federations 
- Cosatu, the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and the Federation 
of South African Laboour Unions (Fedsal) - towards unity, namely: 
rap All federations need to redefine their alliances with political parties. 
This will lead to a reduction of political involvement. 
<sf More emphasis will be put on issues of common concern - jobs, 
training, capacity building and common proposals to Nedlac. 
There are already strong signals that cooperation among the federations 
will continue to grow. 
This chapter has attempted to understand the nature and impact of 
Cosatu's involvement in the elections, which was undoubtedly an historic 
intervention which offered many opportunities for South Africa's largest 
union federation. 
However, Cosatu still faces serious organisational problems, has lost key 
leaders to Parliament and is strategically ill prepared for the new era of 
democracy. Thus the federation is at the crossroads. The% crisis it is 
facing threatens to deprive Cosatu of opportunities it has helped create 
for itself and its members. 
Since the elections, Cosatu and its affiliates have asserted the need to 
'go back to basics' and begin addressing organisational weaknesses. 
Usually this term is taken to mean going back to the strategies the 
unions used in the past to build their strength. 
This is a positive sign, except that it assumes that the context remains 
static. The reality is that the circumstances in which unions organise 
have changed since April 27, 1994. The implications of the new 
circumstances will be explored in the last chapter. 
TAKING DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY 
At first glance it would appear that the transition unfolding in South 
Africa conforms to the prognoses of transition theory. 
The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is effected through 
a process of elite pacting in which reformers in the state and moderates 
in the democratic opposition negotiate a form of representative democracy 
which essentially conserves the pillars of a capitalist order. 
This conservative outcome is essentially attributable to the fact that neither 
the state nor its democratic opposition are able to impose their will on 
the other without inducing a level of chaos that is unacceptable to each. 
Thus the notion of democracy articulated by transition theory represents 
a compromise that holds few prospects for a more radical form of 
participation than is typically encountered in liberal, representative 
democratic systems. Put differently, it is a form of democracy that does 
not extend beyond the realm of parliamentary politics. 
A case can clearly be made for viewing deputy president FW De Klerk's 
faction in the National Party as having a reformist bent while the alliance 
between the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu has been committed to a moderate 
path of negotiating the demise of apartheid. 
It is also reasonable to conclude that neither the former South African 
Defence Force nor the armed formations in the democratic movement 
were able to achieve their respective objectives of suppressing resistance 
to apartheid, and of unilaterally seizing power, without plunging the 
country into Bosnian type civil war. ,, 
The apartheid order was thus dismantled - in line with the 'model' of 
transition - without engendering the chaos predicted by the numerous 
prophets of doom who, prior to the onset of negotiations, were convinced 
that any attempt to wrestle power away from the apartheid regime would 
trigger resistance and counter resistance that would end in the destruction 
of all. 
It is equally clear that the form of democracy established on the basis 
of the Interim Constitution does accord closely with the form of limited 
representative democracy identified in transition theoiy. 
Thus while few could gainsay the fact that real democratic progress has 
been made in the past few years, we must question whether this particular 
form of democracy will prove capable of resolving the conflicts that persist 
in civil society, and of satisfying the aspirations of ordinary people 
demanding a say in the running of the new South Africa. 
In particular, the question arises as to whether this new democratic form 
can accommodate the demands emanating from civil society for greater 
equality at the social, economic and political levels. 
There are, of course, those who would argue that the bourgeois state, 
whatever its form, is inherently incapable of meeting either the democratic 
aspirations of the working class, narrowly defined, or of civil society. 
The claim is that bourgeois states exist essentially to buttress the power 
of classes whose material interests lie in excluding workers and the 
masses from critical decision making processes and otherwise limiting 
their demands to those consistent with the ruling interests. 
In short the argument is that any form of bourgeois democracy is inherently 
incapable of meeting popular aspirations, and that even to work with it 
is to risk drawing the working classes into political practices that involve 
unacceptable compromises of their interests. From this perspective, the 
road to democracy lies in the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and 
the establishment of a socialist society. 
In our view - whatever the theoretical merits of the above argument -
the radical scenario for the future of South Africa is unlikely to materialise. 
In the first place our data tend to suggest that organised workers are 
thus far willing to participate in parliamentary politics and evince no 
significant desire to embark on the kind of politics that would usher in 
a socialist order of the kind described. 
Moreover, the Government of National Unity appears willing to deploy 
forces of law and order against worker militancy as was demonstrated 
in the strike wave and blockades in mid-1994. In addition, our reading 
of the current international environment suggests that the major powers 
would use all means at their disposal to prevent South Africa's workers 
from effecting a revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist order. 
Contemporary democratic movements have the misfortune of entering 
the state when notions of alternative societies have vanished. The collapse 
of Stalinist societies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the 
bankruptcy of social democracy in Western Europe has transformed the 
international climate, delegitimising radical notions of democracy and 
social change. 
This has reinforced the apparent intellectual hegemony of liberal 
democracy and the free market - the 'limited democracy' favoured by 
transition theorists. It has opened up a gap between expectations 
developed by workers during the struggle against apartheid and the 
reality of the form of parliamentary democracy under a Government 
of National Unity. The findings from our survey illustrate this argument. 
The vast majority of respondents subscribe to the notion of direct 
participatory democracy in the workplace, where they see their elected 
representative, the shop steward, as directly accountable to them. With 
this bottom up notion of democracy, most are firmly of the view that 
parliamentary democracy should be substantially the same and must 
consist of the following principles and practices: 
Members of Parliament must report back every time they make 
decisions in Parliament that affect their supporters. 
If Members of Parliament do not do what their supporters want, they 
should be recalled. 
If the new Government fails to deliver, workers will participate in 
mass action to force the Government to deliver on its promises. 
More significantly, there are growing signs of a 'democratic rupture' between 
leaders drawn into corporatist structures and rank and file members. 
We have entered a phase of parliamentary democracy in which the elected 
majority will have a relatively free hand to govern the country even if it 
means abandoning its election manifesto. 
Our respondents, on the other hand, appear to be committed to p. different 
notion of democracy: they tend to view democracy as a continuing process 
of decision making that all people affected should actively engage in. 
In a democratic South Africa class contradictions are coming sharply to 
the fore as the Government of National Unity embarks upon the task of 
national development. The pressure on unions to identify with the goals 
of national development as defined by political leaders is considerable. 
In post-colonial Africa, governments have expected unions to play a 
dualistic role: firstly, that of sacrificing their narrow sectional interests 
to the overall demands of national development and, secondly, representing 
the job interests of rank and file members. 
The argument for the reversal of the primary role of unions to be 
developmental rather than representational has been based on the belief 
that trade unions represent a small and privileged proportion of Africa's 
labour force. As a World Bank report recently argued: 
"...increased union activity raised African real wages in the formal 
sector by about 15% above what they otherwise would have been 
from 1979 to 1990. 
'The evidence is clear that higher wages have led to lower demand 
for labour - although the magnitude of this effect remains in 
dispute...in the absence of the 15% induced increase, formal African 
employment would have been 200 000 to 400 000 above the present 
level of about five million." (World Bank 1994: 7) 
The study concludes that unions have contributed to slowing down the 
overall rate of economic growth. 
Perhaps even more significant was the response of President Nelson 
Mandela and the Government of National Unity towards the 1994 wave 
of strikes in the retail industry: it was said that picketing created an 
environment which jeopardised foreign investment and in this sense put 
sectional interests of the working class ahead of national interest (Sunday 
Times July 24, 1994). 
Similarly, a six week strike in the motor industry was effectively collapsed 
by the Government when it announced a reduction in tariffs on car 
imports, thereby immediately undercutting workers' outstanding pay 
claims. 
Union-state relationships 
Robin Cohen (1974) has tried to capture various union-state relationships 
in post-Colonial Africa by identifying four specific types of relationships. 
The first and most common involves an attempt to subordinate unions 
to the interests of government, where unions are expected to discipline 
their members to facilitate increases in productivity. 
The second type of relationship is a partnership between unions and 
the state, in which unions retain their independence but cooperate closely 
with government. In this relationship unions attempt to combine their 
right to collective bargaining with the goals of national development. 
A third type is one in which the union movement retains its independence 
from government and becomes an ally of the opposition. This leads to 
conflict with the government and the union emerges as an alternative 
locus of power. 
A final scenario is one in which the union movement is independent but 
remains non-aligned politically. The government tolerates this 
independence because unions confine themselves to collective bargaining 
and do not engage in political activity. 
The strength of the labour movement, and the deep commitment to union 
democracy revealed in our survey, makes the first option of union 
subordination to the state unlikely. Before he became Minister of Labour, 
Tito Mboweni acknowledged the temptation of government to subordinate 
the trade union movement in post-colonial Africa. But, he argued: 
"This temptation can best be avoided through the development of 
methods and institutions which seek to increase mutual cooperation 
and joint programmes whilst insuring the independence of the trade 
unions and other organs of civil society." (Mboweni 1992: 28) 
Clearly his approach points towards the second option, that of a partnership 
between an independent union movement and the state. This partnership 
is most visible in the RDP, in which the underlying idea is that social 
movements such as trade unions, civics, youth and student organisations, 
and associations of the unemployed and the aged, would all be part of 
an organised pact to reconstruct society. 
'The democratic government, the trade union movement, business 
associations and relevant organisation of civil society must 
cooperate in formulating economic policy." (ANC 1994: 8}). 
But the constraints on the new Government are considerable. There are 
constraints from business and international agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to follow structural 
adjustment policies and reduce the social wage (through reduced 
expenditure on social welfare), weakened wage setting arrangements 
(including trade union rights), and enforced laissezfaire market systems. 
Attempts to forge social consensus, to prevent the flight of capital and 
scarce skills, and to encourage foreign investment are pressurising the 
new Government to limit its redistributive efforts. The Government is 
likely to be long on promises but unable to meet all its commitments 
in the short term at least. 
In short, it is not difficult to imagine the Government expecting workers 
to sacrifice their 'narrow interests' to the demands of nation building 
and development on the grounds that workers represent a small and 
privileged proportion of the population. The Government might even enlist 
trade union leaders to restrain their members. This will open up conflict 
inside the labour movement between rank and file members and leaders, 
and place considerable strain on the partnership option. 
The dilemma for the Government is whether to try and accommodate 
organised labour and become a state in which the concerns of labour 
predominate, or to allow the interests of capital to dominate, accepting 
the inevitability of a labour dominated socialist opposition. 
This option - the third in Cohen's typology - involves unions entering 
into sharp conflict with the Government and becoming alternative loci 
of power. This is unlikely since our survey points towards a commitment 
to the ANC led Alliance not only in the April 1994 elections but also in 
the election scheduled for 1999. 
The fourth option suggested by Cohen is for the labour movement to 
become completely independent of political parties, in the interests of 
forging a united trade union movement. In terms of this scenario Cosatu, 
Nactu, Fedsal and other trade union groupings would merge and labour 
would decide to concentrate on 'pure and simple' trade unionism. 
This option is attractive and substantial progress has been made since 
the election on unity between the trade union groupings. However, the 
problem raised by collective bargaining unionism is that its exclusive 
focus on workplace issues is likely to accelerate divisions between unionised 
and non-unionised workers, employed and unemployed. 
Research on the labour market points to a growing stratification of the 
black labour force, and in particular the emergence of a skilled stratum 
of African workers (Crankshaw arid Hindson 1990). This creates the real 
possibility of an increasingly divided African work force and a growing 
divide between a well paid unionised work force and a stratum of rural 
and urban poor. 
Given these structural trends, unions face a choice: should they prioritise 
the narrow interests of their members or do they continue to try to 
combine workplace issues with broader developmental issues faced by 
labour in a developing society? 
By attempting to combine workplace issues with wider community and 
political issues, Cosatu has already established a form of unionism which 
challenges the traditional division of labour between union and politics 
- a form of unionism that has been described social movement unionism. 
This form of unionism points towards a scenario not foreseen in Cohen's 
typology of relations between union and state: a possibility that Cosatu 
could become a radical pressure within the Alliance in the form of a left 
or socialist bloc that could propel the Government towards redistributive 
policies by mobilising pressure from civil society, communities and the 
workplace. 
The first signs of such a development emerged in the wave of strikes in 
July 1994, when Cosatu general secretary Sam Shilowa denied that the 
strikes were a battle against the ANC. He said the wave of industrial 
action was aimed at reinforcing the ANC's hand to bring about change. 
By initiating and committing itself to the RDP, Cosatu has made clear 
its commitment to broad national goals. What Sam Shilowa was pointing 
to was the need for Cosatu to imprint workers' demands on national 
development. 
In this way, the possibility of deepening democracy by operating as a 
left pressure within the Alliance holds open the prospect that democracy 
in South Africa might transcend the conservative limits predicted by 
leading exponents of transition theoiy. 
It will be difficult but not impossible for the labour movement to remain 
in the Alliance but not be coopted, and to neither alienate itself from 
its base nor lose its militancy. For this possibility to be realised two 
conditions are necessary. 
Firstly, unions will have to shift from the antagonism that previously 
characterised their relations with the state to a closer working relationship 
with their allies in Parliament and the new Government. A priority will 
be legislation that enables management and labour to genuinely 
co-determine decisions in the workplace. A first step in this direction 
was taken in early 1995 when the Draft Labour Relations Bill was tabled. ] 
The Bill introduces, through the concept of workplace forums, 
co-determination in the workplace. 
Democracy, for our respondents, is not confined to periodic elections 
but is a direct means of empowering both unionised and non-unionised 
sectors of the working class within and beyond the factory gates. Because 
the civics, women's movements, youth and unemployed are the weakest, 
the poorest and the most marginalised, they will experience difficulty in 
developing their organisational capacity. 
If these organisations are to participate meaningfully in shaping social 
and economic policy in bodies such as Nedlac, the development of their 
capacity will have to become a priority for the RDP and departments 
such as Labour. 
The second condition required for a deepening of democracy is, in the 
words of Paul Hirst, 'a programme of reform that would supplement and 
extend rather than destroy representative democracy' (Hirst 1993: 116). 
In our view, this would require integrating the principles and practices 
of direct participatory democracy with indirect parliamentary democracy. 
Although it is unrealistic to run a modern industrial state through the 
principles of direct participatory democracy, it is clear- that any programme 
of parliamentary reform must take seriously the practices and experiences 
of the mass movements that emerged in the 1980s, and especially of 
the labour movement. 
Mechanisms must be found to ensure that the direct will of the electorate 
is expressed in Parliament and that parliamentary representatives are 
made more accountable to the electorate. In Przeworski's words: 
"If democracy is to be consolidated, that is, if all political forces 
are to learn to channel their demands and organise their conflicts 
within the framework of democratic institutions, these institutions 
must play a real role in shaping and implementing policies that 
influence living conditions." (Przeworski 1995: 216) 
This study has been concerned with identifying the expectations of workers 
at the advent of parliamentary democracy. Our next survey, to be conducted 
in 1996, will examine how far these expectations have changed and been 
fulfilled, and the extent to which Parliament and the Government have 
succeeded in 'shaping and implementing policies that influence living 
conditions'. 
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